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THE PROBLEM OF POLICING
Rachel A. Harmon*
The legal problem of policing is how to regulate police authority to permit
officers to enforce law while also protecting individual liberty and minimiz-
ing the social costs the police impose. Courts and commentators have
largely treated the problem of policing as limited to preventing violations of
constitutional rights and its solution as the judicial definition and enforce-
ment of those rights. But constitutional law and courts alone are
necessarily inadequate to regulate the police. Constitutional law does not
protect important interests below the constitutional threshold or effectively
address the distributional impacts of law enforcement activities. Nor can
the judiciary adequately assess law enforcement practices or predict police
conduct. The problem of policing is fundamentally a problem of regula-
tion-a fact largely invisible in contemporary scholarship. While scholars
have criticized the conventional paradigm, contemporary scholarship con-
tinues to operate within its limits.
In this Article, I advocate a new agenda for scholars considering the po-
lice, one that asks not how the Constitution constrains the police but how
law and public policy can best regulate the police. First, scholars should
evaluate policing practices to determine what harms they produce, which
practices are too harmful, and which are harm efficient. These inquiries are
essential to ensuring that the benefits of policing are worth the costs it im-
poses. Second, scholars should explore the full "law of the police "-the
web of interacting federal, state, and local laws that govern the police and
police departments. Presently, for example, courts tailor their interpreta-
tion of § 1983 and the exclusionary rule to encourage changes in police
behavior yet civil service law, collective bargaining law, and federal and
state employment discrimination law simultaneously discourage the same
reforms, a phenomenon ignored by the academy. Third, scholars should
analyze the capacities and incentives of nonjudicial local, state, and feder-
al institutions to contribute to a regulatory regime capable of intelligently
choosing and efficiently promoting the best ends of policing. This agenda
offers a path for moving beyond constitutional criminal procedure toward a
legal regime that promotes policing that is both effective and protective of
individual freedom.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to
Ken Abraham, Josh Bowers, Roger Goldman, Risa Goluboff, Jody Kraus, Robert Newman,
Daniel Richman, Rich Schragger, David Sklansky, and Sarah Stewart for their helpful com-
ments. I am also thankful to Kathleen Delsandro, Adam Fleischer, John Gasink, Alexis
Gregorian, Georgiana Konesky, Ben Massey, Jon Sabol, and the superb reference librarians
at the University of Virginia School of Law for their research assistance. This Article re-
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INTRODUCTION
Police officers are granted immense authority by the state to impose
harm. They walk into houses and take property. They stop and detain indi-
viduals on the street. They arrest. And they kill. They do all these things in
order to reduce fear, promote civil order, and pursue criminal justice. The
legal problem presented by policing is how to regulate police officers and
departments to protect individual liberty and minimize the social costs the
police impose while promoting these ends.
The problem of regulating the police is complex. It requires influencing
a vast number of officers operating in diverse institutional, demographic,
and political conditions. It demands the involvement of local, state, and fed-
eral actors using legislative, judicial, and administrative tools. And it
depends on empirical assessments, theoretical interpretations, and normative
judgments that are widely contested. While courts and commentators have
written extensively on the law governing the police, they have in recent dec-
ades mostly neglected the problem of regulating them. They have largely
treated the legal problem of policing as limited to preventing the violation of
constitutional rights and its solution as the judicial definition and enforce-
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ment of those rights. The problem of regulating police power through law
has been shoehorned into the narrow confines of constitutional criminal
procedure.
This conventional paradigm is necessarily inadequate to regulate the po-
lice. Despite doctrinal rhetoric to the contrary, constitutional law cannot
alone balance individual and societal interests when they conflict. Instead,
constitutional rights establish only deferential minimum standards for law
enforcement, without addressing the aggregate or distributional costs and
benefits of law enforcement or its effects on societal quality of life. Even
within constitutional law, the judiciary alone cannot undertake the problem
of policing. As the Supreme Court's constitutional criminal procedure doc-
trine suggests, empirical and causal analysis is central to both defining and
protecting constitutional rights, yet courts have limited institutional capacity
to engage in that analysis. In short, the public policy problems presented by
the use of police power necessarily extend beyond constitutional law and
courts. Protecting rights and balancing competing individual and social in-
terests require a broader set of regulatory tools and institutions.
Of course, legal scholars have often been critical of aspects of the con-
ventional paradigm, especially of its reliance on courts to protect individuals
and communities from abuses of police power. Despite those criticisms, the
paradigm continues to influence scholarly efforts to understand the problem
and regulate the police effectively. Even scholars who have criticized the
traditional approach continue to view the problem of policing principally
through the lens of constitutional law. They therefore limit their analysis to
constitutional methodologies and the subject matter of constitutional law.
And while some recent work highlights nonconstitutional rules governing
police conduct or utilizes the methodologies of social science to understand
police conduct, it usually does so in service of either conclusions about con-
stitutional doctrines or nonlegal analysis. In short, contemporary scholarship
remains firmly grounded in the conventional paradigm. Scholars have yet to
consider the full range of nonconstitutional legal questions at the core of the
problem of policing.
The ongoing influence of the conventional paradigm has obscured some
of the conceptual preconditions for effectively regulating the police. First,
the paradigm limits the regulation of the police to the problem of identifying
and enforcing constitutional rights. Yet the problem of regulating the police
extends beyond constitutional law to ensuring that the benefits of policing
are worth the harms it imposes, including harms not prohibited by the Con-
stitution. The law should promote policing that effectively controls crime,
fear, and disorder without imposing unjustifiable and avoidable costs on
individuals and communities. Addressing the problem of policing therefore
requires determining what harms policing produces, what kinds of policing
are too harmful, and what kinds are harm efficient. Legal scholars and social
scientists have yet to embrace this inquiry.
Second, courts have difficulty assessing the incentives affecting police
officers, a task central to determining how to encourage police officers to
conform their conduct to law. Scholars have studied many determinants and
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correlates of police conduct, but the conventional paradigm has encouraged
the belief that constitutional criminal procedure is the primary legal influ-
ence on police officers and departments. In fact, nonconstitutional law plays
a much greater role in influencing police officers than has previously been
appreciated. While scholars have begun to consider nonconstitutional law
governing the police, their efforts have been narrow. Scholars have not yet
adequately considered the full web of federal, state, and local laws that gov-
ern the police outside of the context of criminal investigations. This neglect
stymies existing efforts to regulate the police. Presently, for example, courts
tailor their interpretation of § 1983 and the exclusionary rule to encourage
changes in police behavior, yet civil service law, collective bargaining law,
and federal and state employment discrimination law simultaneously dis-
courage the same reforms.
Finally, courts lack the institutional capacity to undertake complex em-
pirical analysis of policing or to constrain the police beyond identifying and
enforcing constitutional rights. Because regulating the police requires such
capacity, it is clear that courts cannot adequately regulate the police by
themselves. Thus, regulating the police requires allocating responsibility
among institutional actors to ensure a regime capable of intelligently choos-
ing and efficiently promoting the best ends of policing. Yet the focus of
scholarship remains on the courts, with little attention to the comparative
roles, capacities, and incentives of nonjudicial institutions that can influence
police conduct.
These neglected areas of inquiry-harm efficiency, the real law of the
police, and comparative institutional analysis-suggest a new scholarly
agenda that asks not how the Constitution regulates the police but how law
and public policy can best regulate them. In this Article, I explore the devel-
opment and limitations of the conventional paradigm and elaborate on this
new agenda.
In Part I, I argue that courts alone cannot effectively interpret or enforce
constitutional rights and that constitutional rights are inadequate to ensure
that police practices are worth their individual and social costs. As a result, I
maintain that the problem of policing requires moving beyond the conven-
tional paradigm to recognize the significance of other institutions and
sources of law in regulating the police. In Part II, I contend that criminal
procedure scholarship remains limited by the conventional paradigm. Con-
sequentially, contemporary scholarship does not fully address the
weaknesses of that paradigm or provide adequate grounding for effective
legal regulation of the police. In Part III, I identify the essential elements of
a research agenda for future scholarship aimed at regulating the police. I
maintain, first, that scholars should evaluate policing practices to determine
whether they are harm efficient as well as whether they are constitutional
and effective; second, that they should identify and explore the full effects
of existing extraconstitutional legal regulation of the police; and third, that
they should thoroughly compare local, state, and federal institutions to de-
termine how to allocate responsibility for assessing and implementing
[Vol. 110:761
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effective, efficient, and coherent regulation of the police beyond constitu-
tional criminal procedure.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL PARADIGM
A. The Warren Court Origins of the Conventional Paradigm
The Warren Court imposed new, concrete constitutional standards on the
police and charged courts with enforcing those standards through the exclu-
sionary rule and civil liability. In so doing, the Court established as law the
now conventional paradigm for addressing the problem of policing: courts
use the Constitution as the primary means of regulating the police.
The conventional paradigm originated in the Warren Court's well-known
jurisprudence. In Monroe v. Pape,' Mapp v. Ohio,
2 Katz v. United States,3
and Miranda v. Arizona,4 the Court enlarged the Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination; implemented the exclusionary remedy for those
enlarged rights; and broadened § 1983 liability. By expanding constitutional
rights, the Court brought constitutional law to bear directly on police offic-
ers and departments. By augmenting constitutional remedies, the Court
facilitated court challenges to police conduct. And by justifying its sweeping
action on the ground that local and state governments had failed to prevent
police misconduct, the Court established the primacy of constitutional adju-
dication for regulating the police. There has been tremendous debate about
the import and consequences of these changes to the law of criminal proce-
dure. But whatever else the Court can be said to have done, it allocated
wholesale the responsibility for solving the problem of policing to courts
and promoted the regulation of the police primarily by constitutional adju-
dication.
The Warren Court expanded the remedies for police misconduct before
it expanded the rights. In 1961, in Monroe, the Court interpreted § 1983 to
permit civil liability for police officers who violated federal rights even if
those officials also violated state law.5 Even more importantly, later the
same year in Mapp, the Court required state courts to exclude evidence ob-
tained by searches and seizures that violated the Fourth Amendment.6 These
decisions gave victims the incentive and means to challenge police conduct,
the courts the opportunity to refine constitutional doctrine, and the police
new reasons to comply with constitutional norms. In this way Mapp, and to
a lesser degree Monroe, made the Amendment newly consequential.
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192.
6. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
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Six years after Mapp and Monroe broadened Fourth Amendment reme-
dies, Katz reshaped the right. Katz eliminated technical requirements that
previously limited the scope of the Fourth Amendment 7 and articulated a
new standard for applying the Fourth Amendment to a police activity-
namely, whether the government intruded on a privacy expectation on which
the suspect "justifiably relied."8 The Court later reframed this test in terms
of whether the government interfered with a defendant's "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy."9 This new approach brought a broader array of police
practices within its ambit, and, by raising far more questions than it an-
swered, Katz's imprecise formulation spurred years of litigation.
In Miranda, the Court for the first time applied the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to police interrogations and imposed
prophylactic rules and an exclusionary remedy to protect suspects during
those interrogations. 10 Like Katz, Miranda subjected additional police ac-
tivity to judicial review, and, like Mapp, the case incentivized litigation and
police compliance. Thus, Miranda achieved for police interrogations what
Katz and Mapp together achieved for searches and seizures.
If the holdings in Monroe, Mapp, Katz, and Miranda enabled courts to
regulate police conduct, their reasoning established courts, especially feder-
al courts, as the primary institution for performing this task. Monroe
reasoned that § 1983 is premised on distrust of both state legislatures, which
might provide discriminatory laws or inadequate remedies, and state courts,
which might neglect to enforce rights even when the law demands it."
Mapp was premised on state legislative and judicial dereliction in protecting
against Fourth Amendment violations. 2 Katz contended that law enforce-
ment self-regulation is necessarily inadequate to protect constitutional
rights. 3 And Miranda began by describing a problem of policing-abuse
7. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz, 389
U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
10. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
11. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74, 183-87 (1961).
12. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) (noting that remedies other than
the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations "have been worthless and futile").
The Court in Mapp further stated as follows:
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire sys-
tem of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise.
id. at 660.
13. The Court stated as follows:
It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is
that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer...
Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding facts
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during interrogation-long left unsolved by police departmental regulation,
states, and federal courts.' 4 These cases thus justified the expansion of con-
stitutional rights and remedies as a means to address the failure of states,
prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and even the federal government to
provide an adequate check on the police. They not only empowered the
courts to use the Constitution to supervise police activities but also presup-
posed a world in which only courts are likely to do so. With this logic,
Monroe, Mapp, Katz, and Miranda created a paradigm for how the police
should be regulated. In that now-conventional paradigm, courts impose and
enforce conduct limits on the police, and those conduct limits constitute the
primary means of regulating the police.
While the Supreme Court's doctrines have changed over time, its enter-
prise has not. Since 1968, the Court has considerably loosened the
constraints on the investigation and detection of crime imposed by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, substantially narrowed the scope of the ex-
clusionary rule, and, after expanding § 1983 liability significantly in the
1970s, contracted liability under § 1983. t s Even so, the paradigm arising
from the Warren Court doctrines remains largely intact. Courts continue to
apply the Fourth Amendment and the Miranda doctrine to require eviden-
tiary exclusion and to permit civil liability to remedy civil rights violations
by the police. Although the Court has occasionally raised doubts about its
earlier rationale that judicial intervention is essential to compensate for the
absence of alternative means of effective regulation, 6 courts continue to
unquestionably showing probable cause, for the Constitution requires that the deliber-
ate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between the citizen and the
police. Over and again, this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the Fourth
Amendment requires adherence to the judicial process ....
Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57 (alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
14. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447 ("[Abuses in custodial interrogations] are sufficient-
ly widespread to be the object of concern. Unless a proper limitation upon custodial
interrogation is achieved ... there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be
eradicated in the foreseeable future.").
15. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (ruling that a suspect
who receives Miranda warnings waives his right to remain silent by making a voluntary
statement to the police absent evidence that he did not understand his rights, despite lan-
guage in Miranda to the contrary); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (ruling that
the exclusionary rule does not apply to constitutional violations resulting from police negli-
gence rather than deliberate or reckless disregard for constitutional requirements or systemic
error); Virginia v. Moore, 533 U.S. 164 (2008) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not
violated by a search incident to an arrest that violates state law); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam) (concluding that qualified immunity protects police offic-
ers from § 1983 suits where no prior cases "squarely govern[ing]" the conduct clearly
establish in a "particularized sense" that the conduct is unconstitutional).
16. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006) ("We cannot assume that ex-
clusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary
deterrence in different contexts and long ago."); id. at 599 ("[T]he extant deterrences against
[knock-and-announce violations] are substantial-incomparably greater than the factors
deterring warrantless entries when Mapp was decided.").
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delimit and protect constitutional rights through criminal cases and civil
suits as if the primary means to regulate the police must and does reside in
the judiciary.
B. The Limits of the Conventional Paradigm
As this description suggests, the conventional paradigm for regulating
the police depends on constitutional rights and remedies defined and en-
forced by courts. Although scholars have criticized aspects of the paradigm,
it continues to shape the academic understanding of the problem of policing
today. 7 As a result, scholars have not adequately clarified the role that the
courts and Constitution can, and cannot, play in defining and addressing the
problem of policing. First, the judiciary cannot alone effectively define or
prevent police misconduct. Even if the problem of policing were limited to
constitutional rights, both defining and enforcing rights require empirical
and causal analysis for which the judiciary is ill suited. Second, the problem
of policing is not limited to constitutional rights. Consequently, courts and
the Constitution play an important role in regulating the police, but the judi-
ciary and the Constitution can never successfully address the problem of
policing without assistance.
1. Courts Cannot Alone Interpret or Protect Constitutional Rights
The conventional paradigm holds that courts ought to and can address
the problem of policing. Courts acting alone, however, will inevitably fall
short of solving this problem, even on the narrow view that the problem of
policing is to ensure respect for constitutional rights. Effective regulation of
the police must include limits on police conduct and provide effective incen-
tives for officers not to exceed those limits. Courts specify those limits when
they interpret the Constitution to restrict police behavior, and they deter vio-
lations when they apply the exclusionary rule and § 1983. Truly effective
limits and deterrents, however, require complex analysis of policing and the
effects of constitutional doctrines on law enforcement behavior. Yet courts
suffer from structural, and therefore systematic, limitations that prevent
them from effectively undertaking this analysis. While the limited capacity
of courts is well known, it is especially debilitating for the criminal proce-
dure enterprise.
a. Constitutional Criminal Procedure Requires
Consequentialist Analysis by Courts
Fourth Amendment doctrine requires courts not simply to discern the
historical, moral, and political demands of the constitutional text, but also to
make empirical judgments about the police and their interactions with citi-
zens, as well as to draw causal conclusions about the repercussions of
17. See infra Part H.
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possible constitutional rules. According to the Supreme Court, courts inter-
preting the Fourth Amendment must appraise the nature of the intrusion on
the individual, the strength of the government's interest in the intrusion, and
the consequences for law enforcement of various possible rules, and then
balance these interests against each other.18 Assessing these considerations
requires courts to draw factual conclusions about matters beyond the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, 9 including, for example, what kinds of
information a search method can reveal2" and whether the same law en-
forcement ends could be achieved by alternative means.
2'
Courts must make these empirical and causal judgments not only when
interpreting the substance of Fourth Amendment rights but also in determin-
ing their shape. The Court has sometimes articulated a permissive rule or
rejected one,22 or established a bright-line rule or refused one,23 because of the
predicted effects of the alternative formulations. In Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, for example, the Court acknowledged that if it "were to derive a rule
exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well
prevail," but it nevertheless ruled against her in order to protect the govern-
ment's "essential interest in readily administrable rules."24 In both the
content of rights and in their design, consequences are deeply embedded in
the heart of the Fourth Amendment.
To be sure, not all Fourth Amendment analysis depends on consequenc-
es. When courts determine what values the Fourth Amendment protects,
when those values are strongest, or when the interests of individuals can be
18. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005); Mich. Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 444-45 (1990); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). Re-
cently, the Court has suggested that balancing should occur only if history provides no
conclusively applicable "traditional standards of reasonableness." See Moore, 553 U.S. at
171; Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 345-46 (2001); Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999). But since history is rarely conclusive or uncontested, this
trend has not avoided balancing the interests at issue.
19. See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication
and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 733, 736-37 (1998).
20. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; id. at 411-13 (Souter, J., dissenting); Kyllo v. Unit-
ed States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
21. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
22. Compare Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (rejecting a permissive
rule regarding the scope of a vehicular search incident to lawful arrest), with Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 26-30 (1968) (formulating a permissive rule regarding when a police officer may
conduct a "stop and frisk").
23. Compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (establishing a rule
permitting full searches of an arrestee's person incident to arrest regardless of the crime that
triggers the arrest and without requiring reason to believe that the arrestee is armed or that
evidence of the crime would be found), with Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983) (fa-
voring a totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining whether a tip establishes probable
cause in part because the alternative two-pronged test would diminish the value of anony-
mous tips and therefore "seriously imped[e] the task of law enforcement").
24. 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001).
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outweighed, they do so in light of the historical traditions and moral princi-
ples that underlie the Fourth Amendment right. Moral considerations are
evident, for example, in the Supreme Court's conclusion that "[i]t is not bet-
ter that all felony suspects die than that they escape."25 Historical concerns
motivated the Court when it declined to require arrest warrants for felons
lawfully arrested in public because "the judgment of the Nation and Con-
gress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on
probable cause.
'2 6
However, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, even the Court's most
principled decisionmaking is inevitably mixed with judgments about conse-
quences.2 7 For example, the Court made its moral judgment about killing
fleeing felons in part because it concluded that its rule permitting deadly
force against only dangerous fleeing felons would not unduly hamper law
enforcement. 18 In cases in which the Court takes account of history, it also
engages in analysis beyond it, because history is often equivocal, disputable,
and not by itself sufficiently persuasive for many justices.29 Inevitably,
Fourth Amendment cases involve a melange of judgments about individuals,
law enforcement, and the future consequences of Fourth Amendment deci-
sions.
25. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). See also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-38
(finding thermal imagers to constitute a search and reasoning that "[t]he Fourth Amend-
ment's protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity
of information obtained .... In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) ("Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn
from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to
escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight."); United States v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed .... "); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (requiring more stringent analysis of searches that intrude into an indi-
vidual's body than other searches of the person because of the serious "human dignity and
privacy" interests at stake).
26. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). See also, e.g., Wilson v. Ar-
kansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) ("In evaluating the scope of [the Fourth Amendment] right,
we have looked to the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
afforded by the common law at the time of the framing."); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 624 (1991) (looking to common law meaning of arrest to determine whether Hodari had
been seized within meaning of Fourth Amendment).
27. See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REv. 415,
415 (1993) ("Rights matter, but rights are not all that matter. Even to those for whom rights
loom large in personal and public decision making, consequentialist considerations of policy
and prudence still occupy a significant proportion of the total decision-making picture.").
28. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 19-20.
29. See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 336-46 (considering historical evidence regarding a
rule limiting custodial arrests and then continuing on to balance competing Fourth Amend-
ment interests); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (considering
historical evidence regarding standards governing the search of a car passenger's belongings
during a traffic stop and then continuing on to balance competing Fourth Amendment inter-
ests to reach a conclusion).
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Miranda doctrine, like Fourth Amendment doctrine, mixes reasoning
about fundamental constitutional values with reasoning about consequences.
The Miranda decision itself is filled with conclusions about moral principles
embedded in the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Thus, for
example, the Miranda Court found psychological intimidation by the police
"equally destructive of human dignity" as physical intimidation.3" At the
same time, however, Miranda was self-consciously premised on the finding
that abusive interrogation techniques were "sufficiently widespread to be the
object of concern."'" The Court also justified requiring warnings in part
based on the predicted effects of its ruling, concluding that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation practice of giving warnings could "readily be em-
ulated by state and local enforcement agencies. '32 While the relationship
between the underlying right and the procedural safeguards in Miranda
doctrine has always been complicated, contested, and unstable, courts
frequently depend on conclusions about law enforcement and the antici-
pated consequences of proposed rules in evaluating whether Miranda has
been violated.3 3 Delineating the scope of Miranda, like determining the lim-
its of the Fourth Amendment, requires courts to assess institutional facts and
analyze consequences.
In addition to defining constitutional rights, courts seek to prevent con-
stitutional violations by police officers through the exclusionary rule and
their interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.34 Whereas the rights-defining
enterprise is partially comprised of consequentialist judgments, this rights-
protecting enterprise is based entirely on the likely effects of enforcement
doctrines on police behavior. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it. ' 35 The
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
31. ld. at 447.
32. Id. at 485-86.
33. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (requiring an un-
ambiguous invocation of the right to silence under Miranda in part because "if an ambiguous
act, omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be
required to make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear intent and face the conse-
quence of suppression if they guess wrong" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (reasoning that Miranda should not be overruled
in part because "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice" and the proposed
alternative "is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to");
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1974) (refusing to exclude evidence obtained in
violation of Miranda in large part because it would not deter future police conduct).
34. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 135 (2009); Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980). Section 1983 is an old and brief statute, and the
Supreme Court exercises unusual control over its contours in the guise of statutory interpre-
tation. It uses that power to vindicate § 1983's purposes, including to deter illegal conduct by
the police. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (outlining qualified immunity
doctrine).
35. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), quoted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
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implicit theory is that excluding evidence deprives the government of crimi-
nal convictions and either that police officers care enough about losing cases
to comply with the law or that those who supervise the police care enough
to pressure officers to do so. The logic of § 1983 deterrence is like that of
the exclusionary rule: threatening liability for money damages leads officers
to comply with the law, and it leads supervisors, chiefs, and cities to influ-
ence them to do so.
This rights-protecting enterprise requires three levels of empirical and
causal analysis by courts. First, § 1983 and the exclusionary rule are likely
to incentivize lawful police behavior effectively only if courts make correct
assumptions about what police officers value and how their professional and
personal motives translate into conduct.36 Second, courts' ability to tailor
these tools to prevent constitutional violations depends on their ability to
forecast how particular legal decisions translate into incentives for officers.
And third, courts must analyze police behavior and institutions to take into
account competing constitutional values. For example, since the Supreme
Court has applied both the exclusionary rule and § 1983 selectively to min-
imize their impact on law enforcement, 37 the Court must predict the
consequences of rulings on efforts to prevent crime as well as on potential
constitutional violations.
b. Institutional Limitations Prevent Courts from Effective
Consequentialist Analysis
Although courts can define and vindicate constitutional rights only if
they are capable of the institutional assessments and predictive analysis re-
quired by the Court's own jurisprudence, they are notoriously ill suited to
these tasks.
For one thing, courts act with grossly inadequate data. In Berkemer v.
McCarty, for example, the Court decided that police officers are required to
give Miranda warnings before questioning individuals arrested for minor
offenses during a traffic stop, but not before questioning individuals de-
tained in routine traffic stops without arrest.3 8 The reasoning rests heavily on
empirical assertions and predictions that lack support. For example, the
Court concluded with respect to arrestees that "[t]he exception to Miranda
proposed by petitioner would substantially undermine" clarity-a "crucial
advantage" of the Miranda rule39-because "the police often are unaware
36. They have been doubted. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 367-
68 (2000).
37. E.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (refusing to apply the exclusionary
rule to knock-and-announce violations in part because of the significant costs to law en-
forcement); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (reversing a refusal to grant
qualified immunity and emphasizing that police officers should be protected from litigation
unless a prior case "squarely governs" the facts at issue).
38. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
39. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)).
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when they arrest a person whether he has committed a misdemeanor or a
felony."4 It also rejected the claim that "law enforcement would be more
expeditious and effective in the absence of a requirement that persons ar-
rested for traffic offenses be informed of their rights," noting that "[t]he
occasions on which the police arrest and then interrogate someone suspect-
ed only of a misdemeanor traffic offense are rare.' In determining that
Miranda does not apply to traffic stops, the Court contended that "[t]he vast
majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes,' 42 that "the typical
traffic stop is public, '43 and that a rule requiring warning "would substantial-
ly impede the enforcement of the Nation's traffic laws ... while doing little
to protect citizens' Fifth Amendment rights." 4 Without doubting the cor-
rectness of either result in Berkemer, one might reasonably wonder, "Says
who?"45
Recently, scholars have encouraged courts to draw more heavily on so-
cial science research to bolster their empirical conclusions as a way to avoid
unsupported assumptions.46 But the problem cannot be so easily cured.
Courts deciding constitutional criminal procedure matters have no effective
mechanism to obtain empirical evidence and incorporate it into their norma-
tive judgments. Most Fourth Amendment questions are contested in state
criminal cases in which neither party is likely to have adequate
resources or incentives to effectively litigate significant empirical questions,
4 7
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at434.
42. Id. at 437.
43. Id. at 438.
44. Id. at 420.
45. The Supreme Court often acknowledges that it relies on intuition to predict the
effects of its decisions on the police. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000)
("In reviewing the propriety of an officer's conduct, courts do not have available empirical
studies dealing with inferences from suspicious behavior, and this Court cannot reasonably
demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. Thus,
the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior."); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979) ("Alt-
hough the record discloses no statistics concerning the extent of the problem of lack of
highway safety, in Delaware or in the Nation as a whole, we are aware of the danger to life
and property posed by vehicular traffic, and of the difficulties that even a cautious and an
experienced driver may encounter." (footnote omitted)).
46. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Crimi-
nal Law and Procedure-and Three Answers, 4 ILL. L. REV. 851, 873 (2002) (arguing that
empirical evidence is relevant to the Court's normative choices in criminal procedure doc-
trine); Meares & Harcourt, supra note 19, at 735 ("call[ing] for a new generation of criminal
procedure jurisprudence, one that places empirical and social scientific evidence at the very
heart of constitutional adjudication" and noting that other scholars have also called for such
use); Symposium, What Criminal Law and Procedure Can Learn from Criminology, 7 OHIfo
ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2009) (exploring lessons from social science research for constitutional
criminal procedure).
47. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 331 (discussing institutional pressures on
defense attorneys that discourage them from litigating defendants' cases aggressively);
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and even a civil plaintiff hoping for compensation after a violent arrest cannot
cost-effectively litigate many matters. Courts also often know so little about
the institutional structures, occupational norms, market pressures, political
influences, and nonconstitutional laws that shape police conduct that they
cannot ask the right questions in making judgments about the police. Even
when courts are able to engage in effective empirical analysis, they have
little opportunity or ability to adjust a doctrine as the facts and social sci-
ence underlying the doctrine evolve.48 As a result, courts have a systematic
and profound disability in ensuring that doctrine accurately reflects the ex-
pected effects of criminal procedure rulings on the behavior of police.
One can see the depth of the problem in the Supreme Court's recent ef-
forts to apply the exclusionary rule selectively. The Court often has refused
to exclude evidence for Fourth Amendment and Miranda violations where it
concludes the benefits are limited, such as where it perceives the kind of
violation at issue to be difficult to deter.4 9 The Court's assessments are based
on selected research submitted by parties, and critics have disputed its con-
clusions about how much the rule deters and in which circumstances the
rule deters best.50 But the problem is not just with the outcome of any par-
Wayne R. LaFave & Frank J. Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 1006-07 (1965). Nor can
judges independently investigate these matters, given the volume of suppression motions.
48. Orin Kerr notes some of these disadvantages in arguing that courts should defer to
Congress in regulating high-tech, new search technologies. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amend-
ment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 801 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, New Technologies]. He points out that courts cannot easi-
ly understand new technologies or alter their rulings based on technological evolution,
especially when that evolution is swift. Id. at 868-69. But Kerr assumes that in other Fourth
Amendment contexts courts are expert fact finders acting well within their institutional core
area of competence, id. at 863-64, and in this he is wrong.
49. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144-48 (2009) (refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule to negligent policy mistakes because doing so is not justified by its deter-
rent effect); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-21 (1984) (refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule when officers conducted an unconstitutional search in good faith reliance
on a warrant because doing so is not justified by its deterrent effect); see also Bd. of Prob. &
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998) (refusing to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment from a parole revocation hearing because doing so is unnecessary
to deter and would provide only minimal additional deterrence); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 447-48 (1974) (refusing to exclude evidence obtained in violation of Miranda in
large part because it would not deter future police conduct).
50. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 942 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's decisions over
the past decade have made plain that the entire enterprise of attempting to assess the benefits
and costs of the exclusionary rule in various contexts is a virtually impossible task for the
judiciary to perform honestly or accurately. Although the Court's language in those cases
suggests that some specific empirical basis may support its analyses, the reality is that the
Court's opinions represent inherently unstable compounds of intuition, hunches, and occa-
sional pieces of partial and often inconclusive data."); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of
Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2009) (contending that the Court in Herring "asserts as
a foregone conclusion, without an iota of supporting analysis or evidence, the proposition
that application of the exclusionary rule in the instance of a negligent violation of the Fourth
Amendment has a reduced 'deterrent effect' ").
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ticular case. The project as a whole is suspect. The exclusionary rule is in-
strumental. By its own lights, the Court should adopt whatever doctrine
prevents the most violations at the lowest cost. Yet the Court has no reliable
means of determining whether selective enforcement of the rule is likely to
achieve that result more cost-effectively than applying the exclusionary rule
consistently to all constitutional violations. The Court has never adequately
justified its selective approach, yet its doctrine requires such a justification.'I
Though legal scholars criticize the Supreme Court's efforts to regulate
the police, they also tend to underestimate the extent of the problem. They
note that courts struggle to formulate effective rules for the police52 and
have difficulty preventing constitutional violations.5 3 They highlight the ob-
stacles to effective court judgments about new technologies,54 and they
criticize courts' empirical assessments in particular cases.55 But contempo-
rary criminal procedure scholars largely continue to view delineating
constitutional rights against the police as well within the core institutional
competence of courts. 6
The mismatch between judicial competence and the requirements of
constitutional analysis distorts the contours of the law in two important
ways. First, courts sometimes draw inaccurate empirical conclusions and
51. The same is true for § 1983 doctrine. The Court has limited § 1983 costs using
qualified immunity doctrine, for example. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638
(1987). But no one-least of all courts-knows how many § 1983 suits for police miscon-
duct are filed or settled each year; what municipalities regularly spend on § 1983 claims; or
what effect these suits have on police practices, much less when § 1983 best deters or how
qualified immunity, insurance, and indemnification affect how much it does so. See Marc L.
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort
Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 760 (2004) (attempting to determine how many tort suits are
filed against police officers and noting that "the most important and revealing features of
litigation against the police [are] hidden in the dark: who pays, and who is held accountable
for the payments? Are payouts a significant portion of the police budget, or do settlements
come out of the general revenues for the city? And even if settlements are a significant ex-
penditure, are there mechanisms to translate judgments into changes in policy or
personnel?").
52. See, e.g., CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVO-
LUTION 3-5, 62-94 (1993); Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 48, at 863-67 (2004).
53. See, e.g., David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce-or
Replace-the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 160 (2009).
54. See, e.g., Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 48, at 864-67.
55. See, e.g., Meares & Harcourt, supra note 19, at 750-93.
56. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COL-
UM. L. REV. 254, 309 (2011) (prescribing changes to Fourth Amendment administrative
search doctrine); Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 48, at 860-64 (arguing that in tradi-
tional cases-as opposed to cases involving new technologies-judges have the institutional
capacity to create rules governing police behavior). I have been no exception. See Rachel A.
Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2008) [herein-
after Harmon, Police Violence] (arguing "that concepts that structure justification defenses
can and should be imported, subject to appropriate modifications into the Fourth Amendment
doctrine regulating police violence").
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make flawed normative arguments about both rights and remedies.57 Se-
cond, courts sometimes set deferential standards or disallow remedies not
because they find facts that justify those determinations but because they
recognize their inability to draw more rigorous conclusions about the
context and consequences of their rulings.58 Either way, as a result of
institutional deficiencies, constitutional rights are not enforced to their "full
conceptual boundaries."5 9 There may be an ineliminable role for courts in
making normative decisions about the moral principles and historical tradi-
tions underlying constitutional rights, given that we ultimately depend on
courts to make such judgments. But the enterprise of regulating the police
by defining and protecting rights requires inputs from institutions other than
courts.
2. Constitutional Rights Cannot Alone Protect Individuals
Adequately from Police Intrusion
Courts lack the institutional capacity to regulate the police without sub-
stantial assistance from institutions designed to amass context-specific
expertise and undertake complex, ongoing empirical analysis. But even if
courts could overcome these barriers, a major objective of police regulation
would still remain beyond their reach. If courts regulate the police, then the
legal problem of policing is limited to constitutional violations. Constitu-
tional rights are, however, structurally ill suited to balance societal interests
in law enforcement and individual freedom.
Some policing is inevitably harmful, no matter how friendly, community
oriented, or well done. Communities embrace policing precisely because
they have an interest in harming some people for the greater good-by ar-
resting those who have committed crimes, by shooting those who run away,
by searching individuals' cars on the street, or by questioning suspects once
they are in custody.
Ideal regulation of the police would provide a normative framework for
properly balancing individual and societal interests. It would specify the
conditions under which the police should, rather than may, harm individual
interests for the greater good. It would ensure that the quality of our lived
57. At least, they are often criticized for doing so. See, e.g., Sherry F Colb, What Is a
Search?: Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Reme-
dy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 187 (2002) (criticizing the Court's normative judgments about
what constitutes knowing exposure); Meares & Harcourt, supra note 19, at 750-93 (criticiz-
ing the Court for failing to incorporate empirical research in criminal procedure cases);
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for
Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005) (describing the Court's third party
doctrine as "one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital age").
58. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Trumping Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 435, 459 (1993) (criti-
cizing the Court for discounting evidence and deferring to other government
decisionmakers); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978) (distinguishing between institu-
tional and analytical reasons for limiting a "judicial construct of a constitutional concept").
59. Sager, supra note 58, at 1213.
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experience is not impoverished but rather enhanced by law enforcement
activities. Ideal regulation would take into account considerations such as
how harmful any police action is to individuals and communities, as well as
how it compares to other means of producing law and order in terms of cost,
harm, effectiveness, and officer safety.
While constitutional rights accommodate both individual and societal
interests, they cannot approach the ideal balance between these interests.
The well-known process by which constitutional rights are articulated and
enforced instead dictates that rights can provide only a limited analysis of
police conduct. First, rights establish only minimum standards for law en-
forcement. Because individuals assert rights against the police rather than
the other way around, constitutional criminal procedure rights are always
framed as a ceiling on government action (or a floor on individual rights)
rather than as a thick account of how to balance competing interests when
the police enforce the law and individuals are harmed. Constitutional crimi-
nal procedure rights are therefore commands about what the police cannot
do, not standards for what they should do.
Second, because rights are categorical once they are defined, that "ceil-
ing" must be lower and more generous to law enforcement than a true
measure of the interests at stake. Constitutional criminal procedure rights set
unbreakable rules for police officers in advance. In the process of defining
rights, courts must thus accommodate the government's interests ex ante. As
a result, the rights themselves are defined to permit law enforcement flexi-
bility in pursuing societal aims. This means, for example, that an
unreasonable seizure may be lawful because it falls within a set of seizures
that are useful to law enforcement and often reasonable.
60
Third, because rights are held and enforced by individuals, usually with
respect to specific actions, they do a poor job of measuring aggregate costs
and benefits of law enforcement activity or its effects on the quality of life
in society. In fact, when we use rights alone to regulate the police, we may
perversely invite excessive but constitutionally permissible harms to legiti-
mate, constitutionally recognized interests. As William Stuntz has pointed
out, constitutional rights effectively tax some police practices and subsidize
others.61 By requiring warrants for house searches, Fourth Amendment law
makes house searches more expensive for the police than Terry stops and
frisks, which require only reasonable suspicion.62 Likewise, Terry stops are
more expensive for the police than consent searches, which require no sus-
picion at all.63 The Fourth Amendment therefore encourages the police to
substitute street encounters for house searches without regard to the total
costs of either practice.' If the vast number of lesser intrusions encouraged
60. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001).
61. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1795, 1822 (1998)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs].





by constitutional rules create aggregate harm that exceeds the harm caused
by the total number of greater intrusions those rules protect against, some
kinds of constitutional regulation may make policing less protective of con-
stitutional interests overall.
Because of these characteristics, police can harm constitutional interests
substantially and undesirably, even when they fully comply with the Consti-
tution. The Constitution provides a rough measure of whether a particular
harm to a constitutional interest is sufficiently justified and not exceedingly
intrusive. But adequately protecting individual and communal interests re-
quires regulatory efforts beyond the contemporary paradigm in the form of
nonconstitutional regulation that ensures adequate justification for harm to
important interests left unvindicated by constitutional law.
Consider the constitutional doctrines governing arrests, Terry frisks, and
asset forfeiture. These doctrines illustrate how constitutional rights test
whether the police have sufficient reason to harm a particular individual, but
do not test whether the policing activity imposes too much harm on consti-
tutional interests. The doctrine that governs home searches demonstrates
that even when constitutional doctrines regulate the manner in which inva-
sions of constitutional interests are carried out, they do not adequately
protect against harms to those interests. Arrests and home searches require
substantial constitutional justification, Terry frisks somewhat less, and asset
forfeiture almost none at all. But all raise the same basic issue: even perfect-
ly constitutional activity can impose serious harms that deserve attention
beyond constitutional law.
Every arrest harms an individual, and perhaps a community, no matter
how lawful. It may be hard to sympathize with the liberty interests of a vio-
lent criminal under arrest, but of the estimated 14 million people arrested for
nontraffic-related offenses in the United States in 2008, only 4 percent were
arrested for violent crimes, fewer than those who were arrested for either
disorderly conduct or liquor law violations.65 In New York City alone, from
1997 to 2006, more than 353,000 people were arrested for possessing small
amounts of marijuana, a single minor misdemeanor.66 Most of those people
65. Crime in the United States, 2008, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Sept. 2009),
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_29.htm. In Washington, D.C., for example,
more than one in five adult arrests were for disorderly conduct in the year 2000. CITIZEN
COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., DISORDERLY CONDUCT ARRESTS MADE BY METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT OFFICERS 2 (2003), available at http://newsroom.dc.gov/file.aspx/release/
7250/disorderly-conduct-policy-recommendation.pdf. By 2009, this number was one in
nine arrests. METRO. POLICE DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 28 (2010), available at
http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/frames.asp?doc=/mpdc/lib/mpdc/publications/ar0-2009_lowres.pdf.
66. HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, N.Y. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION,
MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY
1997-2007, at 4 (2008), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/MARIJUANA-ARREST-
CRUSADE_- Final.pdf. These arrests raise concerns about equality as well as liberty, since
they disproportionately affect the African American community. See id.; Jeremy Travis, Pres-
ident, John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice, Race, Crime and Justice: A Fresh Look at Old
Questions 5 (Mar. 19, 2008), available at http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/extra/speeches/
racecrime-justice.pdf.
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were handcuffed, taken to the police station, booked, and jailed overnight,67
experiences that typically cause serious distress.68 While the Constitution
requires probable cause of criminal activity for each arrest, probable cause
ensures only that there is a reason to arrest the individual, not that the arrest
is a necessary or effective means of enforcing the law or preventing disor-
der. Once the probable cause standard is met, the Constitution has little to
say about whether an arrest is desirable or worth its costs, even though those
questions are crucial to deciding what the police should do.
The same can be said about Terry stops and frisks. In constitutional
terms, a stop under Terry is a minor "seizure," because it is brief, and a
weapons pat down under Terry is a minor "search," because it reveals only
limited information about what is under a person's outer garments.6 9 Any-
one who has experienced a Terry stop, however, knows that the harm to
dignity can be substantial. And anyone who has been frisked knows that the
invasion affects bodily integrity far more than privacy. Being frisked means
being groped by a police officer. The Terry Court understood this latter
point well.70 Yet the constitutional rule established by the Court requires
only "reasonable suspicion" for such a stop or a search-perhaps for good
reason, given that such searches are intended to protect officers while they
investigate crime.7 1 Nevertheless, the constitutional standard permits a vast
number of these searches. In 2009, the New York Police Department alone
conducted more than 575,000 stops and frisks, and it has conducted nearly
three million since 2004.72 Though the New York Police Department is the
country's largest, there are more than 18,000 other law enforcement agen-
cies in the United States. Together, the number of stops and frisks they
conduct is likely mind-boggling, and these intrusions substantially under-
mine the quality of life in some American cities. Yet, so long as each search
and seizure satisfies the Constitution, a police department may use Terry
67. LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 66, at 35.
68. William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 Mo. L. REV. 771, 797-801 (1993); see also Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1132-34 (2008) (describing the process costs of arrests and
demonstrating that they often dwarf plea prices).
69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 145-46 (1972) (characterizing an investigatory stop permitted by Terry as "an
intermediate response" between arrest and ignoring the situation and describing a frisk for
weapons authorized by Terry as a "limited search").
70. The Court described Terry frisks as "a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment," Terry, 392 U.S. at
17, and as a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security ... [and] an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience," id. at 24-25.
71. The reasonable suspicion required for a stop is suspicion with respect to criminal
activity. The suspicion required for the frisk is suspicion that the individual who has been
stopped is armed and dangerous. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
72. Al Baker & Colin Moynihan, Paterson Signs Bill Limiting Stop-and-Frisk




aggressively and strategically with constitutional-and usually legal-
impunity.
Asset forfeitures are also a common tool of the police and are largely
beyond constitutional regulation. Under civil asset forfeiture law, police
may take property from individuals if the property is connected to a crime.
73
Asset forfeiture is self-evidently intrusive: its premise is that seizing proper-
ty from individuals can deter them from criminal activity.74 And yet federal
law encourages it by creating substantial financial incentives for police de-
partments to forfeit property.75 Because these forfeitures are civil rather than
criminal, the Constitution provides limited protection for those subject to
them. As with arrests and Terry frisks, the harms that asset forfeiture threat-
ens to individual constitutional interests cannot be fully addressed by
constitutional rights.
76
Constitutional doctrines test not only whether police can act but also the
manner in which they act. Thus, when a police officer executes a warrant to
search a house, he must do so reasonably. However, just as the Constitution
only roughly measures whether an activity is acceptable, it only roughly
constrains the manner in which it is conducted. As a result, police engage in
many legal but disturbingly intrusive searches: they enter homes at night in
full SWAT gear, bang down doors with battering rams, detain partially
dressed family members, shoot pet dogs when they approach, and damage
interiors during the subsequent search.7 7 Reasonable regulation of the police
73. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1995).
74. Though most of those individuals it affects are never charged with a crime. Eric
Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 77 (1998).
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(e) (2006) (providing for "equitable transfer ... of any
forfeited property to the appropriate State or local law enforcement agency so as to reflect
generally the contribution of any such agency participating directly in any of the acts which
led to the seizure or forfeiture of such property"); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3) (2006) (directing the
attorney general to transfer back to local law enforcement agency proceeds commensurate
with the effort in producing forfeiture in order to "further cooperation between the ... local
agency and Federal law enforcement authorities"); ASSET FORFEITURE AND MONEY LAUN-
DERING SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
ri/projects/esguidelines.pdf (describing equitable sharing component of federal asset forfei-
ture program).
76. Our criminal justice system gives police enormous discretion with the expectation
they will often "exercise discretion not to search and arrest." William J, Stuntz, Virtues and
Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 445 (1997). But asset for-
feiture law gives police departments a direct financial stake in intruding upon individual
property interests. See John L. Worrall, Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil Asset
Forfeiture as a Budgetary Necessity in Contemporary Law Enforcement, 29 J. CRIM. JUST.
171, 183 (2001). As a result, it may considerably overincentivize many searches and arrests,
disrupting the balance inherent in our system. Nevertheless, there has been little national
effort to assess the full costs and benefits of forfeiture programs. Eric P. Baumer, Evaluating
the Balance Sheet of Asset Forfeiture Laws: Toward Evidence-Based Policy Assessments, 7
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 245, 245 (2008).
77. E.g., Pscyhostyle, Columbia, MO SWAT Raid, YouTUBE (May 3, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watchv=RbwSwvUaRqc (showing police execution of search
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would ask not merely whether the officers at the scene had good enough
reason to do each of those things but also whether searches could have been
conducted just as effectively and safely but less harmfully, as well as wheth-
er in a specific case or in the aggregate that level of intrusion is worth the
societal gain. But the Constitution does not demand this inquiry.
Scholars often contend that where a constitutional doctrine does not ad-
equately protect constitutional interests, the doctrine should be changed.7"
While some constitutional doctrines are unquestionably too narrow, the
problem of lawful violations of constitutional interests cannot be solved
through constitutional reinterpretation. Constitutional rights are structurally
incapable of encouraging law enforcement to impose only necessary, fair,
and efficient harms on legitimate individual interests. They are also unable
to require that the means and goals for law enforcement do not undermine
the lived experience of individuals and communities. When law enforce-
ment and individual interests collide, constitutional rights alone cannot
delineate the appropriate balance between the two.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL PARADIGM IN SCHOLARSHIP
The conventional paradigm molds the work of scholars as well as
courts. Although scholars have long been critical of the Warren Court's ju-
risprudence governing the police, legal scholars considering the problem of
policing nevertheless overwhelmingly take constitutional law to be their
method and the scope of constitutional regulation to be their subject. Some
recent scholarship challenges aspects of the conventional paradigm by con-
sidering nonconstitutional law governing the police and by using the social
sciences to better understand how police conduct is shaped. But neither the
traditional scholarship nor the contemporary alternatives fully address the
weaknesses of the conventional paradigm and provide adequate grounding
for effective legal regulation of the police.
warrant); Matt Pearce, Update: SWAT Raid Prompts Columbia Police Review of Policies,
MISSOURIAN, May 9, 2010, http://www.columbiamissourian.con/stories/2010/05/06/update-
swat-raid-prompts-police-review-policies; Matt Pearce, Columbia Police's Internal
Investigation Finds No Wrongdoing by SWAT Officers, MISSOURIAN, May 20, 2010,
http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2010/05/20/police-intemal-investigation-finds-no-
wrongdoing-swat-officers; see also RADLEY BALKO, OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY
POLICE RAIDS IN AMERICA (2006) (discussing paramilitary drug raids and cataloging
examples of intrusive warrant executions).
78. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 206 (2007) (arguing that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence should no longer focus on "the traditional probable cause/individualized sus-
picion model"); Primus, supra note 56, at 261 (arguing that current administrative search
doctrine should be changed because it "imposes few limits on government conduct and paves
the way for indiscriminate searches and seizures"); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman" 's Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV.




A. The Conventional Paradigm's Influence
on Contemporary Scholarship
Scholars have long challenged the normative conclusion of the Warren
Court-that courts and the Constitution should serve as the primary legal
mechanism for regulating the police.7 9 But scholars also largely accept the
descriptive claim that courts and the Constitution do serve that role.8" As a
result, legal scholars studying the police overwhelmingly adopt the methods
and subjects of the paradigm. Since the Warren Court, academics have
largely confined their analysis of the problem of policing in law to constitu-
tional analysis of police conduct that falls within the plausible scope of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
81
The paradigm has two primary effects on thinking about the problem of
policing. First, scholars largely confine their approach to the acceptable
methodologies of constitutional reasoning and adhere to the norms of a spe-
cialized kind of constitutional law. A straightforward approach to regulating
the police would attempt to "determine the objectives, examine the alterna-
tive methods of obtaining these objectives, and choose the best method for
doing so.' '"2 But since the Warren Court, scholars who study the law govern-
ing the police have been constitutional criminal procedure scholars. Rather
than seeking to identify the best means and ends for regulating the police
given the costs and benefits of law enforcement, they evaluate appropriate
limits on police conduct by looking to the text and structure of the Constitu-
tion, the history of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and prior judicial
precedents.83 They might consider the problem that policing poses, or public
79. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 52, at 3-4; Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as
a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 930-31 (1965).
80. See, e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
333-34 (2d ed. 2005); Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers
for the Legal Process School, 3 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 129 (2005).
81. Some scholars have noticed this problem. See Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World
Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 789-92 (2003) ("For four
decades, criminal procedure scholars have focused on federal constitutional rulings by the
Supreme Court."); Elizabeth Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Partici-
pation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 160 (2009) [hereinafter Joh, Breaking the Law]
("[P]olice practices left mostly untouched by federal constitutional law lie beyond the focus
of the legal academy as well."); see also DAVID SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 5
(2008) ("Because thinking about criminal procedure has tended to focus on the questions
taken up by courts, the unfortunate result has been not just that judges have largely failed to
consider the systemic requirements for democratic policing, but that most of the rest of us
have, too.").
82. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 5 (1982).
83. For just a few relatively recent examples in the Fourth Amendment context, see,
for example, I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and
the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2011) (arguing that the text of
the Fourth Amendment supports a notion of Fourteenth Amendment and that from the 1920s
to the 1960s the Court had "interpreted the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in a manner
consistent with the promise of equal citizenship contained in the Fourteenth Amendment");
Colb, supra note 57, at 123 (suggesting a return to the foundations of the knowing exposure
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policy arguments for particular rules, and the costs and benefits of those
rules, but only to the extent that those arguments constitute acceptable dis-
course within constitutional scholarship. 4
Second, scholars take their subject to be Supreme Court cases involving
the Constitution rather than the problem of policing." Hundreds of articles
and books favor or oppose the Warren Court's decisions, arguing that those
decisions were or were not revolutionary, and that the revolution failed, suc-
ceeded, or has been reversed over time.86 Scholars describe and denounce or
defend warrant requirement exceptions or the Court's approach to custody,
interrogation, and waiver. 7 They argue that a police activity falls within or
outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment.8 8 Professors fight for broader
doctrine in order to determine what is appropriately a search under the Fourth Amendment);
and Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 603, 610 (2007) (rejecting the assumption that the Fourth Amendment requires
probable cause, individualized suspicion, or even the exclusionary remedy and instead sug-
gesting that the reasonableness requirement could be met by the proportionality and
exigency principles).
84. For some recent examples in the Miranda context, see, for example, Russell Cov-
ey, Interrogation Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867, 1890 (2005) (concluding that the
policy objectives of Miranda "seem virtually to demand that compulsory interrogation re-
ceive Fourth Amendment scrutiny"); Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings
in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 784 (2006) (pro-
posing revised Miranda warnings, a requirement that police reiterate the warnings
throughout lengthy investigations, and videotaping of interrogations to "more effectively
achieve the intended policy goals of the fight to counsel warnings"); and Christopher Slobo-
gin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309, 316 (2004) (providing constitutional
rationales for mandatory taping of interrogations in order to realize Miranda's goal of regu-
lating interrogation).
85. See Bibas, supra note 81, at 789-92. Though Bibas believes that the paradigm is
breaking down, he is too sanguine about constitutional criminal procedure scholarship and
casebooks today. Although the literature incorporates more reference to "the real world," it
continues to allow the Supreme Court to set the agenda, at least with respect to the police.
Thus, the then-new casebooks that he describes as revamping criminal procedure are orga-
nized by almost precisely the same principles as their predecessors-that is, by the
intellectual architecture of Supreme Court constitutional criminal procedure. See RONALD
JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Ist ed. 2001); MARC L. MILLER
& RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERI-
ALS (1st ed. 1998) [hereinafter MILLER & WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (1st ed.)]; infra
text accompanying notes 105-106.
86. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 52; Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really
So Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police
Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); Symposium, The Warren Court Criminal Justice Revolution:
Reflections a Generation Later, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2005).
87. For some recent examples, see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doc-
trine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine] (defending
the third-party doctrine); and Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from Start to
Finish: Too Much "Routine," Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843
(2004) (criticizing the Court's warrantless vehicle search doctrine).
88. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 57, at 184-87 (criticizing Supreme Court reasoning in
cases like United States v. White that allows it to "classify the government's use of pretend
friends and tracking devices as failing to implicate the Fourth Amendment" and contending
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or narrower readings of the Constitution by revising the Founding history or
minimizing its significance.89 Articles assess the impact of the Court's juris-
prudence on law enforcement, the guilty, the innocent, racial minorities, and
the war on drugs, and often point out the Court's inattention to the same.90
And an extensive literature debates whether the exclusionary rule is good,
good enough, or bad, whether it deters constitutional violations by the po-
lice, and whether it is better or worse than plausible alternatives, which
often means some form of monetary damages.91
By contrast, scholars do not write much about police conduct that does
not end up at issue in criminal cases, such as the misuse of force.92 They do
that "on the logic of Kyllo, rummaging through Greenwood's garbage should therefore be
considered a search"); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 163-64 (criticizing United States v. Drayton and Florida
v. Bostick, arguing that "it does not follow that there was no seizure and no unconsented
search for Fourth Amendment purposes" in each case).
89. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 763 (1994) (consulting Fourth Amendment history as a basis for advocating con-
temporary interpretation of the Amendment, that it requires only that all searches be
reasonable); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 555-56 (1999) (arguing that contemporary interpretations of the Fourth Amend-
ment are inconsistent with the historical meaning of the Amendment for the Framers, but
arguing that return to the original meaning "would subvert the larger purpose for which the
Framers adopted the text"); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment
History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 605-06 (2008) (contending that "many scholars have
misinterpreted Fourth Amendment history" and suggesting that adherence to the original
understanding might improve upon the "chaotic and inconsistent state of current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence").
90. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946, 964-74 (2002) (considering and expanding on existing literature on relationship be-
tween Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and race); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and
Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1459-66 (1996)
(considering and adding to literature on significance of guilt and innocence in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
91. A recent symposium on the Fourth Amendment, for example, considered three
questions: "(1) How important is (should) history (be) to the resolution of Fourth Amend-
ment questions, and how good (or bad) a job does the Supreme Court do in construing
history?; (2) What value(s) is (are) the Fourth Amendment intended to serve?; and (3) Is the
exclusionary rule a good (the best) way of enforcing these values?" Arnold H. Loewy, The
Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 1 (2010). For
just a few creative proposals out of the vast literature on the exclusionary rule, see Guido
Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111 (2003) (proposing a
pairing of punishing police illegalities and reducing defendants' sentences if they are victims
of those illegalities); Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2001) (proposing enforcing exclusion only when police departments refuse
to pay damages set by the court as a penalty for illegality); and Christopher Slobogin, Why
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (proposing an ad-
ministrative damages scheme for Fourth Amendment violations).
92. See Harmon, Police Violence, supra note 56, at 1122 ("Criminal procedure schol-
ars have largely focused on a set of police activities-searches, seizures of property,
interrogations, and techniques of community policing-other than the use of force."); Joh,
Breaking the Law, supra note 81, at 159, 198 (noting that scholars have paid inadequate
"attention to areas where the Court has paid very little attention: undercover policing, police
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not address the majority of police contacts with the public, which are initiat-
ed by a call for service from the public, involve no serious crime or pressing
emergency, and fall outside the scope of the Constitution.93 Few articles
compare institutions in their capacity or incentives to address the problem of
policing, or consider all possible mechanisms that might be used to do so.
And scholars rarely write about the rest of the "law of the police"-the
body of federal, state, local, and even international law that applies to police
officers and departments and influences what they do.94 Thus, there are few
articles on how employment discrimination law, state law enforcement of-
ficer bills of rights, labor law, and civil service laws affect police behavior.
And there are no articles on the implications of laws and regulations estab-
lishing hiring criteria, physical fitness requirements, or residency
requirements for police departments, even though all of these laws and regu-
lations can be intricately related to police misconduct. Instead, legal
scholars write about constitutional law, and according to legal scholars, the
Constitution continues to be the primary means for regulating the police.95
The scholarship is not and has never been naive or uncritical. It has, for
example, long noted limitations of using courts to regulate the police,96 and
it has always recognized the importance of internal departmental
discretion, and police corruption, to name a few"). Of course, some scholars-especially
more junior ones--defy this trend. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL
INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009) (considering law enforcement
practice of offering deals to criminal offenders in exchange for information); Job, Breaking
the Law, supra note 81 (considering undercover policing); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of
Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004) [hereinafter Job, Private Polic-
ing] (considering private policing).
93. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE
EVIDENCE 58 (Wesley G. Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2003). Although most police con-
tacts with citizens are initiated by calls for service, more face-to-face encounters are
traffic-related, either the product of a stop by an officer or an officer responding to the scene
of an accident. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS
BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 3 (2007), available at http:/Ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdt cpp05.pdf (indicating that, in 2005, 56.3 percent of face-to-face contacts
were traffic-related and 29.9 percent involved either an individual reporting a problem to the
police or receiving assistance from them).
94. See infra text following note 128 & Section III.B.
95. There are exceptions to this conventional scholarship. Elizabeth Job, for example,
self-consciously goes beyond constitutional methodology and constitutional subject matter in
considering the police, and thus constitutes a counterexample to some of the limitations I
describe in contemporary scholarship. See, e.g., Joh, Breaking the Law, supra note 81, at 158
(discussing authorized criminality by undercover police officers and considering legal regu-
lation beyond constitutional law); Joh, Private Policing, supra note 92, at 51 (discussing
private police and the nonconstitutional law that regulates them).
96. See Friendly, supra note 79, at 930-32 (arguing that the complexity of criminal
procedure calls for legislative compromise and lamenting the settling of issues for all time by
the Court); Wayne R. LaFave & Frank J. Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's
Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 991-95,




rulemaking in shaping what police officers do.97 But the subjects and meth-
ods of scholars continue to follow the Warren Court vision. The Warren
Court announced what was self-evidently true-that self-regulation of po-
lice was inadequate and that neither federal or state legislatures nor local
governments had systematically addressed the problem of policing. It then
filled that gap with the tools it had. And policing in this country is better as
a result. But the Warren Court framework obscures as well as empowers.
Like courts, scholars since the Warren Court era consider the problem of
preventing constitutional violations, not the problem of regulating the po-
lice.
B. New Trends in Scholarship and the Conventional Paradigm
Although the vast majority of scholarship on legal regulation of the po-
lice since the Warren Court has been constrained by the subjects and
methods of constitutional law, scholars recently have exceeded both limita-
tions of the conventional paradigm. 9s Specifically, some scholars describe
nonconstitutional law that regulates the police more thoroughly, and others
use social science rather than constitutional law to describe determinants of
police conduct. This scholarship teaches new lessons about the laws that
constrain police conduct and the nonlegal factors that shape it, and thereby
partially defies the limits of Warren Court thinking. Despite its significant
contributions, however, new scholarship on policing remains circumscribed
by the conventional paradigm.
1. New Extraconstitutional "Con Law" Scholarship
As noted above, most conventional criminal procedure scholars accept
the descriptive premise of the conventional paradigm-that the Supreme
Court's application of the federal Constitution to local policing is the prima-
ry regulator of the police.99 In recent years, however, some scholarship has
challenged this component of the conventional paradigm, alleging that
meaningful regulation of the police outside of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments already exists. Although this scholarship advances understanding of
the law governing police conduct, it also operates within the conventional
framework for legal analysis of the police.
For example, in two recent articles, Orin Kerr catalogues some means
outside the Fourth Amendment for regulating criminal investigation. In one,
97. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
80-84, 222-224 (1969) (advocating that police discretion should be governed by detailed
administrative rules); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 417-19 (1974) (same).
98. See Bibas, supra note 81, at 789-92 (noting that while scholars continue to focus
primarily on constitutional doctrine, "a shift is afoot," with new scholars writing about poli-
tics, race, and other nontraditional topics).
99. See supra note 83.
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he suggests that entrapment law, the Massiah doctrine, °00 the First Amend-
ment, and internal police department regulations supplement the Fourth
Amendment in limiting undercover police activity. 101 In the other, he de-
scribes federal statutes that supplement Fourth Amendment regulation of
new search technologies.10 2 While Kerr's work draws attention to frequently
neglected statutes and judicial doctrines that constrain police conduct, Kerr
ultimately uses these nonconstitutional alternatives to defend his interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment: He describes and lauds statutory regulation
of privacy in order to argue for legislative implementation of ideal Fourth
Amendment doctrine. 03 And he argues in favor of the third-party doctrine to
undermine one component of the paradigm-the claim that constitutional
law provides the primary regulation of the police-in order to deflect critics
who might claim that constitutional law should regulate the police because
other means of regulating the police are inadequate.'O° In both cases, his
work is illustrative of recent scholarship in criminal procedure: it continues
to contribute to the "con law" enterprise even as it describes nonconstitu-
tional law governing the police.
Even when scholars do not expressly make claims about constitutional
law, their forays into nonconstitutional law governing the police often
remain constrained by the conceptual structure of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment doctrine. For example, Marc Miller and Ron Wright have been
rightfully lauded for their casebook, Criminal Procedures.'05 This book ad-
vances understanding of the regulation of the police considerably by
presenting cases, statutes, and administrative regulations from local and
state actors that illustrate local variations in laws governing the police. It
also adds some subjects rarely considered in the criminal procedure canon,
such as internal administrative remedies, community policing, and juvenile
curfews.
The Miller and Wright book, however, expands rather than transcends
the conventional paradigm. While it recognizes sources of law governing
the police beyond courts interpreting the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, it
100. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Supreme Court prohibited
the use of incriminating statements against a defendant at trial because they were obtained in
the absence of his attorney after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached. The Massi-
ah doctrine prohibits the police from deliberately obtaining information from a defendant
after formal charges are brought in the absence of counsel or a knowing, voluntary, and intel-
ligent waiver of the right to counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397-406 (1977).
101. Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 87, at 590-94.
102. See Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 48, at 840-57.
103. Id. at 838.
104. See Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 87.
105. MILLER & WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (lst ed.), supra note 85; accord Bibas,
supra note 81, at 794 (describing Miller and Wright's book as representing a "huge" and
"welcome" shift in emphasis); Robert Weisberg, A New Legal Realism for Criminal Proce-
dure, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 909, 909 (2001) ("Marc Miller and Ronald Wright have produced
perhaps the most original criminal procedure book in many years, because it departs more
than any other casebook from the conventional model of building all material around United
States Supreme Court cases.").
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primarily describes rules that regulate police conduct during criminal inves-
tigations-the subject of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments-rather than the
full range of laws shaping police conduct, such as those that determine how
police officers are hired and managed. And it is organized very much like
other casebooks-into chapters analyzing searches, seizures, and interroga-
tions in accordance with the Supreme Court's Fourth and Fifth Amendment
doctrines. 10 6 Thus, the Miller and Wright book inherits the analytic architec-
ture of constitutional law even as it defies the almost exclusive focus on
constitutional doctrine that scholars studying the law governing the police
have otherwise embraced.
10 7
2. New Legal "Non Law" Scholarship
A second and more dramatic trend in contemporary legal scholarship
has been to leverage nonlegal tools to provide a richer account of policing
than traditional criminal procedure scholarship allows. Thus, scholars such
as William Stuntz, David Sklansky, Tracey Meares, and Bernard Harcourt
use public choice theory, political science, and sociology to describe the
political economy, professional culture, real-world behavior, institutional
conditions, and demography of policing. 10 8 This scholarship challenges the
conventional paradigm by using nonconstitutional methodologies to de-
106. Even where Miller and Wright most depart from traditional doctrine, in their first
chapter addressing "Daily Interaction Between Citizens and Police," MARC L. MILLER &
RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS
(2d ed. 2005), at 3-31 [hereinafter MILLER & WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (2d ed.)], the
materials are largely organized around Supreme Court doctrines, including community care-
taking and vagueness. Another innovative casebook, CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATION, LEGAL HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL,
AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS (2007), also pushes the bounds of the traditional paradigm by
conceiving of the police expressly as a distinctive subject of legal regulation. However, this
book too is organized by Supreme Court doctrine.
107. See supra note 85. Of course, since Criminal Procedures is a casebook, one might
argue that the authors have pedagogical rather than scholarly reasons to tie themselves to the
conventional paradigm. Nevertheless, the book has been fairly treated by other scholars as an
innovation in scholarship as well as teaching. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 105, at 909.
108. See, e.g., BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 21-24 (2007) (referencing economic models of profiling,
probability, and actuarial science); SKLANSKY, supra note 81, at 3-9 (describing project of
drawing insights from political science literature on democratic theory for contemporary
policing); Meares & Harcourt, supra note 19, at 749, 786, 773 (referencing sociological
theory, demographic surveys, and police professionalization); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523-43 (2001) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Pathological Politics] (focusing on political economy and institutional dynamics of
policing). Other notable legal scholars contributing to a nonlegal understanding of the police
are Jeffrey Fagan and Tom Tyler. See Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken
Windows Revisited, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D.
White eds., 2009) (assessing the economic and demographic impact of "broken windows"
policing strategies); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING
PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002). Fagan and Tyler, like
Harcourt, have academic training in other disciplines as well as law.
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scribe determinants of police conduct outside of constitutional law, and it
provides a fuller account of the costs and benefits of policing. In these ways,
this new literature challenges both components of the conventional para-
digm in scholarship: that constitutional law provides the method for
studying the legal regulation of the police and that it delineates the subjects
of that study. Despite its strengths, however, this criminal procedure schol-
arship can mostly be considered either "con law" or "non law." Scholars use
an enriched analysis of the police either to draw conclusions about constitu-
tional doctrine-reentering the conventional paradigm--or without
reference to legal doctrine at all.
For example, influential criminal procedure scholar William Stuntz drew
on public choice theory to analyze the interaction between constitutional
criminal procedure, substantive criminal law, and police conduct. He noted,
for instance, that police enforce laws against cocaine powder and crack dif-
ferently because public, downscale drug markets are easier to pursue under
contemporary constitutional doctrine than upscale markets that occur behind
closed doors. 0 9 More often than not, however, Stuntz used his insights into
policing to draw conclusions about constitutional criminal procedure rather
than legal regulation of the police more generally, arguing that constitutional
doctrine causes a problem for policing, that it could be adjusted to fix a
problem, or both." II Other scholars do the same. I
As part of a broader, much-celebrated turn toward interdisciplinarity,
empiricism, and criminology, other policing scholars reexamine many of the
costs and benefits of police conduct."' Thus, for example, Bernard Harcourt
109. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780, 794 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Political Constitution]; Stuntz, Race, Class, and
Drugs, supra note 61, at 1799.
110. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137
(2002) [hereinafter Stuntz, Local Policing] (arguing for changes to the Fourth Amendment
and Miranda doctrine in order to improve crime control while improving protections of lib-
erty and privacy in the face of concerns about terrorism); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson,
Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001)
(arguing that defects in Fourth Amendment law caused problems in the O.J. Simpson and
Bill Clinton cases and that improvements to Fourth Amendment law could mitigate such
problems); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 108 (arguing that constitutional doctrine
causes pathological tendencies in policing, prosecution, and punishment); William J. Stuntz,
Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975 (2001) (arguing that the Miranda doctrine has
been an ineffectual way to regulate police conduct).
111. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1159 (1998) (discussing relationship between com-
munity policing and current criminal procedure doctrine); Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old
Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIo ST. J.
CRIM. L. 105, 110 (2005) (critiquing the Court for failing to emphasize fundamental fairness
in crafting constitutional criminal procedure); David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule
Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 580 (2008) (suggesting that in spite of vast changes
in policing over the past four decades the exclusionary rule still plays a significant role in
governing police under our system of criminal procedure).
112. While scholars have called before for incorporating insights from criminology into
criminal procedure, see, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small
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challenges the empirical and theoretical premises of broken windows polic-
ing, arguing that this policing approach does not prevent crime.'1 13 And Tom
Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan, and others examine the costs of common street-
policing techniques to public perceptions of police legitimacy and, by
extension, to crime control.114 But this work bypasses legal analysis entirely
in favor of empirical or institutional conclusions-even when it purports to
contribute to legal scholarship.1 5 Thus, these scholars primarily add to the
social sciences from which they draw, exiting entirely from the legal enter-
prise of understanding and solving the problem of policing. As these
examples suggest, new trends in legal scholarship concerning the police
push the limits of the conventional paradigm, but they do not yet transcend
them. The result is that contemporary legal scholarship on policing does not
adequately recognize or foster the project of governing police conduct
through law.
1 16
III. BEYOND THE CONVENTIONAL PARADIGM:
A NEW SCHOLARLY AGENDA FOR THE PROBLEM OF POLICING
The police are already shaped by law. To be effective, however, legal
regulation of the police must be grounded upon a broader conceptual foun-
dation that the conventional paradigm has obscured. Effective governance of
the police requires a normative framework for assessing whether constitution-
ally permissible policing practices properly balance efficacy against individual
and social harms. It requires assessing means for influencing police conduct.
And it requires allocating responsibility to institutional actors to ensure a
regime capable of choosing and promoting the best ends. As a result of the
conventional paradigm, the scholarly agenda has not been tailored to identi-
fy the best ends, mechanisms, or institutions for regulating the police.
Rather, three prerequisites for regulating the police outside the conventional
paradigm have been neglected.
World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 529 (1992), this new literature takes
policing rather than criminal procedure as its subject.
113. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 8-11, 57-180 (2001).
114. See, e.g., TYLER & Huo, supra note 108, at xiv-xv (arguing that "the way in which
members of the public are treated by legal authorities-process-based policing ... can en-
hance their willingness to cooperate with and defer to those legal authorities" and that by
reinforcing legitimacy, police officers can increase long-term legal compliance); Jeffrey Fa-
gan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 123, 139 (2008) (explaining
that erosion of legitimacy harms cooperation and legitimizes the rejection of "legal and so-
cial norms").
115. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence
from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006); Erik
Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IowA L. REV. 1107 (1999); David Alan Sklansky, Not Your
Father's Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006).
116. As I have noted, there are counterexamples of legal scholars on policing who defy
many of these limitations. See supra notes 92, 95.
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First, since the problem of policing extends beyond constitutional law to
developing goals for effective and harm-efficient policing, regulating the
police requires understanding the full costs and benefits of policing and its
techniques. But the conventional paradigm distorts the agenda of legal
scholars and social scientists. For example, as a result of the conventional
paradigm, academics interested in criminal procedure often devote them-
selves to assessing the costs and effectiveness of Miranda warnings" 7 and
the exclusionary rule. 118 Even if the exclusionary rule and Miranda are
components of a multifaceted regulatory regime, questions about them re-
cede in importance if these tools are not the primary means of influencing
police conduct and the Constitution is not the main standard by which polic-
ing is measured. By contrast, scholars insufficiently study the comparative
costs and benefits of policing techniques, and therefore have not provided
an adequate basis for establishing affirmative goals for harm-efficient polic-
ing.
Second, determining how to influence police misconduct requires un-
derstanding the determinants of police conduct, including existing
opportunities to influence that conduct and their limitations. While scholars
have studied many determinants and correlates of police conduct, they have
not adequately considered the full set of federal, state, and local laws that
create and influence the police. Instead, focusing on constitutional criminal
procedure obscures the complex set of laws that shapes what police officers
and departments do. This neglect has stymied efforts to regulate the police
effectively. Presently, for example, courts tailor § 1983 and the exclusionary
rule to encourage reform in police behavior, but federal and state employ-
ment and labor law simultaneously discourage the same reforms. As noted
in Section II.B, some new scholarship describes state and federal conduct
rules outside constitutional law and examines the interaction between sub-
stantive criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure. But there
remains a vast, unexplored realm of law that governs policing, and under-
standing that law is essential to promoting effective police reform.
117. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?: A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055,
1059-60 (1998) (using regression analysis to conclude that clearance rates have declined as
a result of Miranda); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 652-665 (1996) (tentatively concluding that Miranda results in lower
conviction rates but noting that police have adapted to its requirements).
118. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to
Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of
"Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983) (reviewing a National Institute for
Justice study and others and concluding that the effect of the exclusionary rule on disposition
of felony arrests was exaggerated); Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Search-
es: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y
315 (2004) (reporting results of direct observation of police behavior to determine compli-
ance with Fourth Amendment); Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants,
Motions to Suppress and "Lost Cases:" The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Juris-
dictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034 (1991) (studying incidence of "lost"
exclusionary rule cases when police acquire a search warrant).
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Third, if courts are limited in their capacity to govern the police, then
addressing the problem of policing requires allocating institutional respon-
sibility for regulating the police more broadly. That in turn requires
comparing the incentives and capacities of the main institutional actors: po-
lice departments, local governments, state courts, state legislatures, federal
and state administrative agencies, and Congress. While some new criminal
procedure scholarship has contributed to this task, the project of regulating
the police effectively requires more analysis to determine the best mecha-
nisms and institutions for reform. This Part makes some initial observations
about what these projects might entail.
A. Harm-Efficient Policing
Regulation of the police should provide a normative framework for bal-
ancing individual and societal interests. As Part I argued, constitutional law
does not ensure that police actions are necessary or justified. Police officers
may impose constitutionally permissible harms on individuals and commu-
nities that are nonetheless ineffectual in reducing crime, fear, or disorder.
Regulation of the police should promote harm-efficient policing-that is,
policing that imposes harms only when, all things considered, the benefits
for law, order, fear reduction, and officer safety outweigh the costs of those
harms.
Presently, though our intuitions about policing practices are tied closely
to whether those practices are worth the costs they impose, debates about
them focus on whether the practices are constitutional or whether they are
effective, not whether they are harm efficient. As Part I noted, for example,
Terry stop and frisks can impose substantial individual and aggregate costs.
Those costs are most visible in New York, where the New York Police De-
partment has engaged in almost three million stops over the past five years.
Some critics of the program contend that it should cease because it is un-
constitutional. They argue that many of the stops are insufficiently justified
by individual suspicion and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment. They
also contend that the program amounts to racial profiling in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 119 Other critics argue that New York's program is
ineffectual as a means of crime control. For example, some scholars have
argued that Terry stops undermine police legitimacy, which in turn under-
mines public compliance with law and cooperation with law enforcement. '120
Procedural justice theorists therefore oppose aggressive Terry stops and
frisks as "counterproductive" in fighting crime and producing order. 21 Ad-
119. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ 1034, 2011 WL
3856515 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Floyd.Complaint-
08.01.31 .pdf.
120. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsus-
tainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
335, 350 (2011).
121. See, e.g., id.
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vocates of the program, by contrast, contend that it is both effective and
constitutional. 1
22
This debate often erroneously presumes that constitutional and effective
police tactics are justifiable. Even if, as some critics claim, many stops are
unjustified, by the critics' own measure, hundreds of thousands of stops per-
formed by the New York Police Department each year are likely based on
sufficient individual suspicion. 123 Many of those are against white New
Yorkers, and some solve or prevent serious crimes. 24 One can imagine a
well-designed stop-and-frisk program that could be both constitutional and
effective in preventing crime and disorder. But such a program might still be
undesirable. If the harm costs of such a program are high, and the benefits
are limited, then stop and frisks could be harm inefficient and therefore un-
justified.
Harm efficiency is presently a matter largely left to the local political
process, and police departments and local and state governments already
take it into account in governing policing, at least to some degree. Depart-
ments adopt, for example, internal regulations forbidding consent searches
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even though constitutional
law demands no individualized suspicion before requesting consent to
search.125 But whichever institutions shape this form of regulation and what-
ever mechanisms are used to promote it, in order for regulatory actors to
promote harm-efficient means of policing, scholars need to lay the ground-
work. This requires establishing theoretical accounts of what the relevant
harms are and how the harms should be measured, and empirical work
measuring and comparing harms and policing efficacy. This work has not
yet been done. 26
Scholars research the effectiveness of policing techniques. 27 And some
scholars assess empirically the harms policing techniques impose, especially
122. See, e.g., Ray Rivera & Al Baker, Police Cite Help From Stop-and-Frisk Data in
170 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A15 (describing the New York police commission-
er's contention that data collected through stop and searches provided a "breakthrough for
detectives" in solving crimes).
123. See, e.g., Report of Jeffrey Fagan at 4, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ
1034, 2011 WL 3856515 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/Expert_- ReportJeffreyFagan.pdf.
124. See id. at 22, 56.
125. Compare Charlottesville Police Department, Biased Based Policing General Order,
06-02 (2005) (on file with author), with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232
(1973) (noting that a search request may be the logical result of police investigatory proce-
dures and not requiring individualized suspicion to initiate one).
126. Though some scholars have pointed out the aggregate costs of particular aggres-
sive policing policies, see, e.g., Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social
Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Oth-
ers?, 34 GA. L. REV., 1253, 1285-87 (2000), better analysis requires more fully fleshed
theoretical work on how to evaluate such policies.
127. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 93, at 228-29; David Weisburd & John
E. Eck, What Can Police Do To Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. Sc!. 42, 50-51 (2004).
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with respect to racial impact and legitimacy. 128 But there is no substantial
empirical or theoretical literature that presently can be used to compare po-
licing techniques with respect to both effectiveness and harm. Instead, harm
efficiency is a side note in scholarly arguments about policing strategies, if it
is present at all.
Critics of zero tolerance and broken windows policing, for example, of-
ten contest their effectiveness rather than object to their costs, though the
most powerful objection to them is that they are harm inefficient. 129 In re-
sponse to concerns about these strategies, scholars have advocated
potentially more harm-efficient alternatives, such as problem-oriented polic-
ing, hot spots policing, and pulling levers policing. 130 But they have
advocated these strategies primarily on the ground that they are effective at
crime control. Accordingly, research on these philosophies has been focused
more on their effects on crime and disorder rather than their individual and
communal harms or whether they are less intrusive than feasible alternatives.
Even when scholars make secondary claims about harm efficiency in promot-
ing a policing strategy, those claims are supported by anecdotes rather than
evidence.' Until scholars lay the conceptual and empirical groundwork for
understanding harm efficiency, institutional actors will be stymied in their
efforts to regulate the police toward this end.
128. But this literature is often devoted to assessing the effects of these harms on crime
control. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do Peo-
ple Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 262
(2008) (considering public evaluations of police decisionmaking and arguing that study re-
sults show that "legitimacy shapes willingness to cooperate with the police in fighting
crime").
129. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 113, at 7, 57-121 (contending that "there is no
good evidence to support the broken windows theory").
130. See Anthony A. Braga & David Weisburd, Problem-Oriented Policing: The Dis-
connect Between Principles and Practice, in POLICE INNOVATION 117 (Anthony A. Braga &
David Weisburd eds., 2006); David Kennedy, Old Wine in New Bottles: Policing and the
Lessons of Pulling Levers, in POLICE INNOVATION, supra, at 155; Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The
Limits of Hot Spots Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION, supra, at 245.
131. Research on the High Point Drug Market Intervention Strategy developed by Da-
vid Kennedy and Sue-Lin Wong provides an example. While the "High Point Strategy" is
primarily justified as a means of reducing violent crime and closing public drug market
areas, its supporters also note that "[it does not produce the community harms that our tradi-
tional street-sweeping, unfocused efforts of the past have." See DAVID M. KENNEDY &
SUE-LIN WONG, JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE HIGH POINT DRUG MARKET
INTERVENTION STRATEGY, at v (2009), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/
RIC/publications/e08097226-HighPoint.pdf (quoting a police department chief commenting
on the impact that the High Point Strategy has had in the local community). While the strate-
gy's effectiveness and ability to mobilize communities have been subject to considerable
evaluation, its claims about being less harmful to individuals and communities than alterna-
tives have been less well examined, in part because the theoretical grounds for evaluating
harm efficiency are not in place.
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B. The Neglected Law of the Police
Constitutional criminal law is not the primary law that regulates the po-
lice in the United States. Instead, there is a substantial body of law that
creates, empowers, influences, and constrains the police and those that su-
pervise them. This law-the law of the police-is far more extensive than
the law that courts or scholars have taken into account, and understanding it
is a prerequisite for effectively regulating the police.
1. The Example of Employment Law and Civil Rights Litigation
Ignorance of the law of the police already undermines efforts to protect
civil rights. Consider the interaction between the judiciary's efforts to en-
courage changes in police departments and state and federal employment
and labor law. The courts often attempt to prevent constitutional violations
by excluding evidence and imposing damages, but their efforts cannot
achieve their aim effectively because collective bargaining, civil service
laws, and employment laws discourage reform.
Both § 1983 and the exclusionary rule rely on departments to shape
officer conduct. Section 1983 may have little direct effect on police offic-
ers who often have qualified immunity, are indemnified, or are judgment
proof, but it may weigh more heavily on departments in cities that pay
judgments. The exclusionary rule cannot work if officers do not care
about securing convictions, and only departments can make them care,
whether through formal or informal incentives. Thus, courts can succeed
at preventing constitutional violations only if their doctrines encourage
police departments to take cost-effective measures to prevent constitution-
al violations by officers.
Experts largely agree about the reforms departments should undertake to
prevent misconduct. The best departments hire psychologically stable and
physically capable officers. They require substantial initial and ongoing
training. They provide clear, specific policies and practices, and tailor train-
ing and equipment accordingly. They maintain effective mechanisms for
reporting, investigating, and responding to legal and policy violations by
officers, including retraining, counseling, disciplining, or firing officers
when necessary. And they usually have an early-warning system that identi-
fies potentially misconduct-prone officers so that the department can
intervene proactively.132 To promote civil rights, the exclusionary rule and
§ 1983 should encourage these or similar practices.
132. See JEFFREY J. NOBLE & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, MANAGING ACCOUNTABILITY
SYSTEMS FOR POLICE CONDUCT 286-88 (2009); SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 100-01 (2005); Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alterna-
tive Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State "Pattern or Practice" Statute, 19 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 508-10 (2009) (describing the mechanisms of early warning




The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have expressly tailored
§ 1983 liability to incentivize almost precisely these best practices. Depart-
ments and supervisors may be held liable for inadequate hiring
procedures'3 3 and for failing to train subordinates adequately.134 They can be
liable for acquiescing in unconstitutional conduct by failing to adequately
investigate complaints or discipline officers. 135 Thus, courts have found
§ 1983 liability where doing so would incentivize departmental reforms
likely to reduce misconduct. While the exclusionary rule is less finely tai-
lored, its costs accrue to departments, and it should have the same effect: it
should encourage departments to adopt reforms likely to reduce constitu-
tional violations.
The incentives for reform are, however, only one side of the equation.
The costs of reform also dictate what departments do, and other legal incen-
tives can impose costs on a department's choices. In the limiting case, for
example, it would be pointless for federal law to incentivize reforms that
violate state law. But even if the desired reforms are legally permissible,
federal law cannot achieve much reform by imposing liability if state and
local laws impose significant costs on the most effective reforms, creating
countervailing economic and political incentives not to adopt them. This is
the case now.
In a majority of states, for example, civil service laws heavily regulate
recruiting, promoting, transferring, demoting, and terminating public em-
ployees, including police officers. 136 These rules impose significant
restrictions on how departments hire.137 More importantly, these laws em-
power employees to challenge any internal managerial action that affects
them on both substantive and procedural grounds in a formal adversarial
process. These challenges ensure frequent and costly legal battles when po-
lice departments demote, transfer, or fire any officer. 138 Whatever the
133. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-05 (1997).
134. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); City of Okla. City v. Tut-
tie, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1239-
41 (10th Cir. 1999); Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991); Brandon v.
Allen, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1265-70 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
135. See Vineyard v. County of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (af-
firming finding of liability for inadequate policies of supervision, discipline, and training that
amounted to deliberate indifference toward unconstitutional conduct); Parrish v. Luckie, 963
E2d 201, 207 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming liability for police chief in light of system in which
reports of physical and sexual assault by officers were discouraged or even covered up);
Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 145-47 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming liability for a
pattern or practice of refusing to investigate incidents of misconduct or to discipline offic-
ers).
136. I am using the term "civil service law" broadly to include other state and local
laws that provide adjudicative mechanisms to appeal the hiring, demotion, reassignment, or
firing of police officers on either substantive or procedural grounds.
137. See WILL AITCHISON, THE RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 96-97 (6th
ed. 2009).
138. See, e.g., David Armstrong, Conduct Unbecoming: Second Chance for Bad Cops;
Chiefs Say Civil Service Thwarts Discipline, Bos. GLOBE, May 21, 2000, at Al (describing
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benefits of these laws in insulating the police from political influence, civil
service laws impose significant additional costs on police departments try-
ing to manage, discipline, or fire officers who commit misconduct. They
therefore disincentivize precisely the same conduct that § 1983 and the ex-
clusionary rule should encourage. Given this counterincentive, § 1983 and
the exclusionary rule may not prevent constitutional violations effectively-
or perhaps at all.
139
Worse, civil service laws are likely to be an especially efficient disincen-
tive. A supervisor facing an officer who sometimes uses too much force
faces two basic options: he can address the problem by transferring, retrain-
ing, demoting, or firing him, or he can leave him be. If the supervisor does
nothing, the officer may someday engage in misconduct, which may cause
cognizable injury to a victim. That victim may find a lawyer willing to sue,
and the city may face some costs as a result, which may translate into some
costs for the department. But if the supervisor transfers, demotes, or fires the
officer, or even if he demands retraining, the same supervisor faces the prac-
tical certainty that the officer will appeal within the civil service system. The
officer's counsel will be experienced in civil service appeals and funded by
the police union. That appeal will also often be heard de novo by a group of
political appointees that is sympathetic-if not beholden-to officers'
interests. 140 And that appeal will impose significant immediate costs on the
city and department, in addition to potentially undermining the chief's au-
thority. Thus, even if § 1983 imposes significant costs on departments, those
the difficulty of firing police officers accused of misconduct). Although Massachusetts may
be an extreme case, it is hardly unique in making efforts to discipline officers costly. Manda-
tory arbitration for discipline appeals provided for by collective bargaining can have similar
effects and is perhaps even more favorable to officers. See AITCHISON, supra note 137, at 98;
Jane Prendergast & Kevin Aldridge, Ex-Cop May Be Rehired: Evidence Ruled Insufficient in
Owensby Death, CIN. ENQUIRER, May 6, 2004, at IC; Jane Prendergast & Robert Anglen, 10
Fired Officers Returned to Force: City Lost All Cases Taken to Arbitration, CIN. ENQUIRER,
Jan. 18, 2001, at IA; see also AITCHISON, supra note 137, at 107-86 (describing dozens of
civil service or arbitration appeals of internal discipline in which the appeal resulted in less
discipline than was imposed by the department).
139. Unfortunately, data about police misconduct and its remedies are presently too
limited to say how well constitutional remedies deter. See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting
Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28-34 (2009) [herein-
after Harmon, Proactive Policing] (noting that data on police misconduct is limited and
describing how the absence of mandatory data collection limits the effectiveness of efforts to
enforce 42 U.S.C. § 14141). Moreover, there are many obstacles to deterring police miscon-
duct with constitutional remedies other than the costs imposed by other legal doctrines. See,
e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law
Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2010) (contending that law
enforcement agencies lack basic information about lawsuits against their cities and officers);
Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
453, 475 (2004) (arguing that chiefs of police may tolerate police brutality because the polit-
ical gains of aggressive policing outweigh the financial costs of liability); Daryl J. Levinson,
Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 345, 345 (2000) (contending that government actors do not internalize financial
costs against cities in the same manner as private actors).
140. See, e.g.,Armstrong, supra note 138.
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indeterminate costs will be imposed sometime in the distant future, while
the costs of civil service appeals will be certain, swift, and substantial.14'
This interaction between § 1983 and civil service laws may do more
than hinder efforts to address officer conduct in specific instances; it also
may have pernicious systemic effects on efforts to prevent police miscon-
duct. Experts have trumpeted the importance of strong internal disciplinary
mechanisms in preventing misconduct. 4 2 However, when a department
knows that an officer has violated the Constitution but takes no personnel
action in order to avoid a civil service appeal, it increases the risk that the
department will later be subject to § 1983 liability for failure to discipline,
train, or terminate officers. Even if a department would sooner face that lia-
bility risk than the civil service appeal, it would surely prefer to avoid both.
Because discovering misconduct triggers the dilemma, the department can
reduce its expected costs by weakening its internal misconduct investiga-
tions. If it does not know of the misconduct, it cannot easily be held liable
for failure to discipline, train, or terminate officers. 4 3 Though going too far
could risk liability for deliberate indifference to constitutional violations,
144
the department probably could significantly reduce the number of findings
of misconduct-and therefore the number of times it faces this problem-
without stepping over that line. The interaction between civil service law
and § 1983 may therefore perversely undermine the very accountability that
courts seek to strengthen. 
4
141. Civil service rules may discourage police officers as well as supervisors from
action. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259,
267-68 (2000) (explaining how officers face vastly greater risk of liability for wrongful acts
than for failing to act and noting that civil service protections, which generally prevent work-
ers for being fired for merely doing a bad job, further discourage action).
142. See NOBLE & ALPERT, supra note 132, at 207-08.
143. A city that is not directly liable for failing to prevent misconduct may still face
costs if the officer is held liable for the misconduct and the city has indemnified the officer.
See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 E3d 681 (1997) (finding the City of Chicago re-
sponsible for paying damages awarded against a police officer pursuant to a state
indemnification statute even though the claims directly against the city had been dismissed).
Where indemnification is mandated by statute or is widespread and is also broadly construed,
one would not expect departments to have a strong incentive to diminish internal accounta-
bility to avoid external liability.
144. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-92 (1989) (holding that failure to
adequately train police officers can create § 1983 liability if it "amounts to deliberate indif-
ference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact").
145. The tax imposed by civil service laws can have other effects as well. To avoid the
costs of a civil service appeal, departments will often negotiate with an officer to resign ra-
ther than be fired. See Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer
Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 541, 559, 560
n. 116 (2001) [hereinafter Goldman & Puro, Revocation]. Once he resigns, however, he is
free to apply to any of hundreds of other law enforcement agencies in the same state, so long
as he is not decertified. Most states have restrictive decertification mechanisms that do not
permit decertification for many kinds of misconduct. See ROGER L. GOLDMAN, NAT'L Ass'N
FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE CASE FOR PEACE OFFICER DECERTI-
FICATION (2011) (on file with author) (describing the limits on state revocation of
certification). Of course, we might not fear this as much if the second department could learn
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Collective bargaining rights deter department-wide changes intended to
prevent constitutional violations even more dramatically. Imagine a depart-
ment that wants to strengthen the effectiveness of its disciplinary process or
change its promotion standards to avoid rewarding overly aggressive
policing. In the thirty-six states that require collective bargaining, police
departments are required to bargain with police unions before imposing any
new rule that could affect any term or condition of employment. 146 This bar-
gaining must continue in good faith until the parties reach an agreement or
an impasse. An agreement will presumably require compromise with the
union, which typically will oppose policies that increase internal accounta-
bility for police officers. Courts will not step in to resolve an impasse unless
the negotiations have been at length and the department has negotiated in
good faith. If the department fails to bargain before implementing a new
rule, the union may bring an unfair labor practice charge against the de-
partment, which can be costly to defend. Collective bargaining therefore
functions like an immediate tax on those internal departmental reforms. 147
While civil service and collective bargaining laws provide particularly
clear cases in which the Court's efforts may be undermined by the law of
the police, many other laws may also interfere with policing reform. For
example, federal employment discrimination law constrains hiring,
promoting, transferring, and firing officers.1 48 State law enforcement officer
the circumstances of the resignation from the first, but in many cases, the first department
will avoid conveying any information for fear of a defamation suit or a suit for depriving the
employee of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. See Goldman & Puro, Revoca-
tion, supra, at 548-49; see also Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-69
(1972). Thus, nonconstitutional law may promote an unfortunate result: officers with a histo-
ry of misconduct who move from department to department.
146. See John M. Collins, Thirteen Ways To Lose a Labor Case, POLICE CHIEF
(Nov. 2009), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfmfuseaction=display
&articleid=1 940&issueid=l 12009. Some states and local governments allow, but do not re-
quire, collective bargaining, and in many of those jurisdictions, contracts with public employees
require such bargaining. In 2007, Congress considered H.R. 980, which would have required all
states and local governments to collectively bargain with public safety employees, including
police officers. Forty-one percent of local police departments, employing seventy-one percent of
all officers, authorized collective bargaining for sworn personnel. Collective bargaining is ap-
parently effective. The average starting salary for entry level officers was $8,900 higher in
departments that authorized collective bargaining than in those that did not. MATTHEW J. HICK-
MAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2003,
at 12 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd03.pdf.
147. For both civil service and collective bargaining, the timing is aggravated by the
fact that police chiefs have a limited expected tenure, and that tenure is dependent in part on
the costs they incur for the department and city while on the job. As a result, they will more
heavily discount future costs and more heavily count immediate costs than other actors. See
Harmon, Proactive Policing, supra note 139, at 47 (noting that police chiefs heavily discount
future costs and benefits "because they may be out of office when those costs and benefits
are felt, whereas the near-term costs and benefits will often dictate their political futures").
148. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101-
07, 104 Stat. 327, 330-36 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2006)); Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006); Martin J. Mayer, ADA and the Hiring Process, POLICE
CHIEF (Sept. 2009), http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display
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bills of rights interfere with departmental efforts to investigate miscon-
duct.'49 Fourteenth Amendment doctrines give officers a means to challenge
termination or demotion for failing to satisfy due process or equal protection
standards. 150 Ironically, even Fourth Amendment law may undermine re-
form, at least to some extent, because it limits the circumstances in which
police departments can search patrol cars and station houses to investigate
employees for misconduct.'
5'
Moreover, the legal context in which departments operate is not static.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") was passed
to protect older workers from discrimination in employment. The statute
initially applied only to private employers but was amended to protect local
government employees, including police officers, in 1974.152 Following liti-
gation over how to apply the ADEA to police departments,'53 Congress
inserted a public safety exemption into the ADEA in 1986, making its pro-
visions once again inapplicable to local police departments. 154 That
exemption expired in 1993, and police departments were again subject to
&issue_id=92009&categoryID=3; Karen J. Kruger, When Does an Employment Discipli-
nary Action Violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of the Liberty Interest?, POLICE
CHIEF (Mar. 2008), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction
=display&articleid=l 107&issue id=22007.
149. See Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability?
An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers' Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J.
185, 200-01 (2005). They often limit the timing, location, circumstances, and content of
disciplinary interviews. Id. at 217. Many other state laws affect the hiring and management
of police officers. New York, for example, has Civil Service Law, Public Officers Law, Mili-
tary Law, Town and Village Law, state human rights and general employment laws, and the
Public Employees Fair Employment Act (The Taylor Law), all of which affect the hiring and
management of the police. New York City has additional rules, including the Municipal Civil
Service Rules. See N.Y. STATE, DEP'T OF CIVIL SERV., SUMMARY OF NEW YORK STATE
CIVIL SERVICE LAW ii, 1 (2008), available at http://www.cs.ny.gov/pio/publications/
summofcsl.pdf.
150. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 535-48 (1985); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Kruger, supra note 148.
151. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (holding that "whether [a
public] employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-
case basis"); see also Kim Wilson, When Does an Employer's Search of Employee
Work Areas Violate Privacy Rights?, POLICE CHIEF (Aug. 2009), http://
www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article-id=1568&is
sue-id=82008. This, of course, the Supreme Court has realized, see City of Ontario v. Quon,
130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010), though not in conjunction with the incentives created by § 1983 and
the exclusionary rule.
152. Martin Schiff, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Whither the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification and Law Enforcement Exemptions?, 67 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 13,
14 (1993).
153. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980) (remanding
for consideration of whether the ADEA exemption applied to the forced retirement of a po-
lice chief at fifty-five); EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750 (D. Minn. 1982)
(holding that the ADEA exemption did not apply to the forced retirement of a police chief at
sixty-five).
154. See Schiff, supra note 152, at 14-15.
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suits under the ADEA. I5  In 1996, Congress acted again, partially exempt-
ing public safety employers from the ADEA.
15 6
As these examples suggest, departments enter a legal minefield whenev-
er they take employee action or make new policies.'57 This is not to say that
we should eliminate any of these laws. They all have complicated effects:
civil service rules were, perhaps ironically, created in part to reduce
misconduct by reducing corruption and partisanship in policing.'5 8 Collec-
tive bargaining results in higher salaries for police officers, which may
attract more qualified candidates and therefore reduce misconduct. 5 9 More-
over, these laws may be justified because they protect officers' rights and
reduce discrimination, even if they also inhibit reform. Still, these laws in-
teract in significant ways with § 1983's and the exclusionary rule's intended
incentives to reform. Yet courts have not much considered them, or even
recognized their potential relevance, in shaping § 1983 and the exclusionary
rule. 160
Legal scholars have likewise failed to consider the effects of legal re-
gimes that tax departmental efforts to prevent constitutional violations, such
as civil service law, collective bargaining, and employment discrimination
law. Instead, scholars have inferred that § 1983 cannot work because cities
pay significant damages pursuant to § 1983 yet continue to engage in police
misconduct, and they have speculated about why. No scholar, however, has
analyzed the other side of the equation-the full costs and legal obstacles to
reform that could counter any incentives federal law creates.
Consistent with the conventional paradigm, courts and scholars contem-
plate constitutional law and its remedies rather than the broader problem of
policing. As a result, courts and scholars have neglected the effects and in-
teractions of the full range of laws that influence the police. As the example
of employment and labor law suggests, this neglect already undermines
legal efforts to prevent misconduct. The problem of policing requires
comprehensive consideration of the real law of the police.
155. Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999).
156. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 119(1),
100 Stat. 3009, 3009-23 to -24 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 6230)(1) (2006)).
157. Julie Risher, Supervisory Law Basics for New Chiefs and Other Supervisors,
POLICE CHIEF (Aug. 2006), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?
fuseaction=display&article-id=976&issue-id=82006.
158. See, e.g., Craig D. Uchida, The Development of the American Police: An Historical
Overview, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 17, 26-27 (Roger G.
Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 6th ed. 2010).
159. See HICKMAN & REAVES, supra note 146, at 12.
160. Quite to the contrary, the Supreme Court has sometimes assumed the effectiveness
of internal accountability mechanisms. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99
(2006) (describing internal departmental discipline as an effective alternative to the exclu-
sionary rule for deterring civil rights violations).
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2. Categorizing the Law of the Police
The vast web of law regulating the police can be divided into five cate-
gories. The first two encompass much of the law that is commonly thought
to regulate the police: the law that authorizes or restricts the conduct in
which they may engage, and laws that remedy, punish, or disincentivize
violations of the first category. However, the law within these categories is
not limited to constitutional criminal procedure doctrines or remedies, and
the law of the police is not limited to these categories. In addition, there is
law that governs police qualifications and training, law that regulates the
management and organization of police officers, and law that governs the
availability of information about police activities.
a. Conduct Rules
Laws that expressly regulate police conduct come from diverse sources
ranging from the Vienna Conventions on Consular and Diplomatic Rela-
tions, which limit police power to engage in searches, seizures of property,
and arrests, to a San Francisco ordinance that prohibits police officers from
questioning people about immigration status.1 6' Federal law, for example,
contains more than a dozen statutes that regulate police searches, electronic
surveillance, and access to private information. 162 These include the obvi-
ous-such as Title 111,163 which governs wiretaps, and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act,"6 which imposes requirements for law en-
forcement access to e-mails-and the obscure, such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, which restricts law enforcement access
to and use of medical records. 165 And federal law concerning the police is
161. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967); Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations, opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
(entered into force Apr. 24, 1964); S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 12H (2007).
162. These include the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, the Drivers Priva-
cy Protection Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Pen Register Act, the
USA-PATRIOT Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the
Family Education Right to Privacy Act, the Cable Communication Policy Act, the Video
Privacy Protection Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and the
Privacy Protection Act, among others. See Solove, supra note 57, at 763-78 (discussing fed-
eral statutes regulating police investigation using new technologies).
163. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802,
82 Stat. 197, 212-23 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2006)).
164. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201[a],
100 Stat. 1848, 1861 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006)).
165. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, for instance, restricts
law enforcement access to medical marijuana prescriptions permitted under local or state
law. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to 1320d-6 (2006); Deedee Correll, Privacy Act Hinders
Police Investigations: Federal Law Stops Cops from Getting Patient Details Quickly, Co-
LO. SPRINGS GAZETTE, May 11, 2003, at Al; Kim Wilson, HIPPA and Law Enforcement
Access to Medical and Mental Health-Care Records, POLICE CHIEF (Aug. 2009),
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not limited to statutes regulating searches and seizures. For instance, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act provides for
local police enforcement of federal immigration law,' 66 and the Law
Enforcement Officers Safety Act allows qualified active and retired law
enforcement officers to carry a concealed firearm anywhere in the United
States, even if forbidden by state law.
167
Federal law concerning the police is not limited to statutes. Federal con-
stitutional doctrines outside of the Fourth Amendment and Miranda also
affect the police: the First Amendment limits the conditions under which
police officers may make arrests for breach of the peace, disorderly conduct,
and resisting arrest. 68 And the Brady doctrine requires police officers to
maintain and disclose to prosecutors any material evidence that might be
favorable to a defendant. 169 As these examples suggest, federal regulation of
police conduct outside of the Fourth Amendment and Miranda doctrine is
considerable.
State constitutions, statutes, and regulations regulate police conduct
even more extensively. Local police officers are created by state law, which
both grants power to police officers and restricts its exercise. Thus, state
statutes permit police officers to engage in community caretaking and crim-
inal law enforcement, require police to aid citizens in limited circumstances,
mandate that officers arrest suspects in domestic violence cases, and forbid
the police from asking questions unrelated to the subject of a traffic stop, for
example.170 State constitutional law frequently mirrors federal law, regulat-
ing searches, seizures, and interrogations, but it is often interpreted more
expansively to control police behavior that is beyond federal constitutional
protection. 171 Local ordinances further restrict police conduct, limiting the
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm? fuseaction=display&articleid
=1854&issueid=82009.
166. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (added as § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act by § 133 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act)
(authorizing the federal government to enter into agreements with state and local law en-
forcement agencies to permit those agencies to enforce federal immigration law).
167. 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B-C (2006). There are two narrow exceptions. The statute does
not override state laws that permit private landowners or state or local governments from
restricting concealed firearms on private or government property. id.
168. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 463 (1987); PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980); Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378
(9th Cir. 1990); Jones v. State, 798 So. 2d 1241, 1248 (Miss. 2001); State v. Janisczak, 579
A.2d 736 (Me. 1990); see also WRIGHT & MtLLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (1st ed.), supra
note 85, at 15.
169. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963); United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 388 (9th Cir. 2004).
170. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6(1)
(2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307(b)(1) (1996); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.10(4)(a)
(McKinney 2009).
171. Or not. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below




use of race in police actions, for example. 7 2 Finally, departmental adminis-
trative rules provide the most important guidance to police officers about
what they may and may not do.
173
The number and variety of laws expressly controlling police behavior
beyond constitutional criminal procedure are substantial, but there are also
laws that indirectly restrain police conduct. Substantive criminal law pro-
vides an important example. Local police sometimes spend resources
proactively investigating suspicious individuals, seeking to stop acts of vio-
lence before they occur. What regulates arrests in those cases is not the
quantity or quality of the evidence the police have, which the Fourth
Amendment regulates, but the laws that create inchoate crimes and in doing
so permit police to intervene before the full harm is done-that is, state laws
governing attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation. Where the police seek to
prevent harm rather than uncover its perpetrator, the question governing
police action is often not whether the police have probable cause but wheth-
er the suspect has yet committed a crime.
b. Remedies
The second category, laws that provide remedies for violations of rules
governing police conduct, includes most obviously statutes that authorize
federal and state criminal prosecution, state civil suits for damages, 7 4 state
evidentiary exclusion, and suits by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") under
42 U.S.C. § 14141 for equitable relief, as well as the federal exclusionary
rule and § 1983. There are also other less well-studied sources of law gov-
erning remedies for police conduct that is unconstitutional, illegal, or merely
against administrative regulations. These include remedies provided by state
law, such as state suits for equitable relief 75 and state revocation of
police officer certification, which prevents officers from reentering law
enforcement in the same state.' 76 They also include internal administrative
172. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 14-151 (2010).
173. To say that there are many legal rules regulating police conduct is not to argue that
existing law covers the field. Some matters-such as what suspect identification procedures
are used or whether interrogations must be recorded-are now at least arguably inadequately
regulated. But this is not because there are no legal rules governing these activities. It is
instead a question of which institutions make the rules, and whether those institutions make
the right ones.
174. State and federal civil and criminal suits are also subject to defenses, such as self
defense, the public authority defense, and entrapment, all of which can set limits on police
conduct. These defenses may therefore fall into the first category of laws.
175. See, e.g., People v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-Civ-0364, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13364 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001); Walker & Macdonald, supra note 132, at 482 n.15 (citing
People v. City of Riverside, No. 355410 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.riversideca.gov/rpd/AGTF/stipjdg.pdf).
176. This approach to reform is not entirely neglected. Roger Goldman and Steven Puro
have long advocated the use of decertification (also called revocation) to discourage police
misconduct. See Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to
Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45, 47 (1987).
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rules within police departments that establish procedures for taking, investi-
gating, and resolving complaints and impose punishments for misconduct,
often through an internal affairs unit.'77 These internal processes provide the
most commonly used remedy for misconduct and, in many jurisdictions,
interact with other remedies, such as where local ordinances, charter
amendments, and public referenda also provide for external review of ad-
ministrative remedies by an auditor or civilian oversight agency.'78
While scholars have often compared at least some direct remedies for
misconduct, law also provides what might be considered indirect remedies
that remain ignored. Giglio v. United States, for example, requires prosecu-
tors to disclose to defendants any impeachment material bearing on the
credibility of prosecution witnesses.'79 Police officers are often witnesses for
the prosecution, and many testify regularly in the course of their work. If an
officer accumulates accusations of dishonesty or bias that would have to be
disclosed, prosecutors will sometimes pressure his police chief to reassign
him 8° rather than have him work cases in which he could become a key trial
witness or could affect the prosecutor's bargaining power during plea nego-
tiations. Mindful of the essential relationship between prosecutors and the
police, chiefs often comply and move the officer to a less appealing admin-
istrative assignment. 8' Giglio only regulates some kinds of police conduct,
it only works if the officer has already been caught for prior misconduct,
and it depends on the incentives of prosecutors. But it nevertheless suggests
a yet unconsidered mechanism for incentivizing police conduct beyond the
search and seizure context, at least with respect to repeat offenders, a signif-
icant problem in policing. 82
177. State laws often control police complaint, investigation, or disciplinary proceed-
ings. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-181 (West 2011).
178. See Samuel Walker, Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN OVER-
SIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 1, 11-13 (Justina Cintr6n Perino ed., 2006) (describing
alternative models of citizen oversight and noting ways they interact with internal discipli-
nary mechanisms).
179. 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
180. Of course, as I have already suggested, employment, labor, and civil service laws
may make it expensive to transfer such an officer. See supra text accompanying notes 136-
139.
181. Some big departments effectively designate "liars' squads" for such officers, an
unattractive administrative assignment for officers whom prosecutors do not want to use.
Lisa A. Judge, Disclosing Officer Untruthfulness to the Defense: Is a Liars Squad Coming to
Your Town?, POLICE CHIEF (Nov. 2005), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/
index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article-id=744&issueid= 112005.
182. See INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COM-
MISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 37-39 (1991), available at
http://www.parc.info/clientfiles/Special%20Reports/1%20-%20Chistopher%2OCommision.pdf;




c. Qualification and Training Requirements
Some of the most important rules and laws governing the police are
state and local laws in the third category, those that set standards for hiring,
training, and certifying police officers. These rules fundamentally determine
the kind of policing we have, and yet they have received almost no analysis.
For example, every state has a peace officer standards and training
commission ("POST") that establishes minimum qualifications and training
requirements for police officers as well as a process for licensing them.183
These commissions dictate who can become a police officer. They control
how old and how educated police officers must be and what kind of criminal
record they can have, factors that may affect whether officers are likely to
engage in misconduct. They regulate the hiring process for officers, includ-
ing, for example, whether officers must pass psychological or medical
screening, and they are the primary determinant of what kind and how much
training police officers receive."' These commissions are the reason that an
average officer receives 60 hours of firearms training, 36 hours of emergen-
cy vehicle operations, 44 hours of self defense training, and 12 hours in
using nonlethal weapons, but only 8 hours of ethics and integrity training
and 8 hours of mediation or conflict management training before he is li-
censed-a situation that probably influences which techniques officers use
when confronted with conflict.185 POSTs are administrative agencies, yet
little has been written about how they should be organized to avoid undue
influence by the police officers and departments they regulate, what their
powers can usefully be, or how their regulations interact with other means
of promoting lawful and harm-efficient policing.
Local ordinances supplement state law governing police qualifications.
These also receive little attention from scholars, and yet can have notable
effects. For example, a residency requirement may narrow the pool of po-
tential officers sufficiently that no other laws can raise police minimum
standards for officer hiring without threatening to deprive localities of
enough qualified officers to achieve their law enforcement goals.'86 Thus,
183. See Richard C. Lumb, Standards of Professionalization: Do the American Police
Measure Up?, 17 POLICE STUD, 1, 3-4 (1994) (describing the history and activities of
POSTs).
184. See id. at 8-10; see also MATTHEW J, HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2002, at 10 (2005), available
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta02.pdf. For an overview of Peace Officer
Standards and Training Commissions, see IADLEST Model Minimum Standards, INT'L
Ass'N OF DIRS. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS AND TRAINING, http://
www.iadlest.org/Projects/ModelStandards.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (noting that an
overwhelming majority of police academies develop the content of basic training pursuant to
state commissions and that more than half of academies used state tests). In some jurisdic-
tions, the standards are recommended rather than mandatory.
185. See HICKMAN, supra note 184, at 9.
186. See, e.g., David W. Murphy & John L. Worrall, Residency Requirements and Pub-
lic Perceptions of the Police in Large Municipalities, 22 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 327, 331 (1999) (noting that many departments oppose residency
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while state POSTs often introduce education requirements or other profes-
sional standards as a means to induce reform,'87 doing so may be
counterproductive if local ordinances also impose qualification require-
ments.
Other sources of police qualifications exist, too. The Lautenberg
Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, for example, changed federal
gun laws to prohibit individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic vio-
lence crimes from possessing a firearm.'88 The Gun Control Act also applies
the prohibition to those subject to a restraining order or dishonorably dis-
charged from the military. As a result of this law, individuals in these
categories cannot serve as sworn police officers in most jurisdictions, even if
state law would otherwise allow them to serve. As this example suggests,
laws can impose indirect-and even possibly unintended-employment
requirements on the police. Since these federal requirements also affect the
size of the pool of potential officers as well as who becomes an officer, they
constitute one more piece of the web of laws that governs American polic-
ing, and yet these laws and others like them have been largely overlooked
by scholars interested in shaping police conduct to protect civil rights.
d. Laws Governing Police Management and Organization
The fourth category involves law regarding the organization of police
departments and management of police officers. As this Article has already
suggested, federal and state employment and labor law has enormous influ-
ence over the police and efforts to regulate their conduct, including through
civil service law, collective bargaining law, employment discrimination law,
law enforcement officer bills of rights, and Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment doctrines. But many other laws also govern how police departments
work and manage officers. State laws and regulations do everything from
authorizing the existence of police departments to setting qualifications for
the police chief. Federal law, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, has in-
fluence over when the police work, including how shifts are structured to
address overtime thresholds, a major financial and administrative issue for
police departments. And the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination has distinctive application to government employees that
frequently restricts the use of statements compelled in administrative
investigations of police officers against them in criminal prosecutions." 9
requirements because they reduce the quality of officers that a department can attract); Kevin
Johnson, Police, Firefighters Challenge Residency Rules, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2006, at 5A.
187. Police officers with a college education use significantly less force than other
officers. See Jason Rydberg & William Terrill, The Effect of Higher Education on Police
Behavior, 13 POLICE Q. 1, 19 (2010).
188. Pub. L. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 to 3009-372 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921-22, 925 (2006)).
189. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (holding that statements
made by police officers and other government employees upon threat of termination cannot
be used in subsequent criminal proceedings consistent with the Fifth Amendment's privilege
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City charters and local ordinances dictate who hires and fires the police
chief, and thus often who ultimately controls policy in the police depart-
ment. And all of these laws interact. 190
e. Laws Governing Access to Information about the Police
Finally, a variety of state and federal laws govern public access to in-
formation about the police. Open records laws permit the public to access
some information about police departments and their management, and
some states expressly require departments to collect and disclose data about
policing.191 But many states restrict public access to data about police mis-
conduct, either through generally applicable statutory exemptions, such as
exemptions for personnel records or for criminal investigations, or through
specific exceptions for law enforcement.19 As a result, internal disciplinary
records and citizen complaints against an officer can be unavailable to the
public, affecting significantly the degree to which the political process can
be used to hold the police accountable for their actions. In this context and
in others, state laws are often interpreted to inhibit access to information
about the police. Some states, for example, have applied laws governing
recorded communications to prohibit videotaping or audiotaping citizen
interactions with the police.' 93 The full legal landscape concerning infor-
mation about policing, and the questions of law enforcement transparency
and privacy which it raises, remain largely unexplored. 194
against self-incrimination). Police departments and officers can use Garrity as a shield as
well as a sword. If departments or officers release compelled statements by defendant offic-
ers, they can significantly hinder state and federal prosecutions.
190. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crane, 595 P.2d 129, 133 (Cal. 1979) (addressing the interac-
tion between a charter that gave the city manager sole power to discipline employees and a
police union's assertion that any dispute could be submitted to an arbitrator under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement). Other laws affect the management of the police officers more
indirectly. Some-such as the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act of 1994, which grants individuals who leave civilian jobs for military service reemploy-
ment rights-are laws of general application that disproportionately impact police
departments. Pub. L. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-33 (2006), 5
U.S.C. § 8432b (2006)).
191. See, e.g., Kirwan v. Diamondback, 721 A.2d 196, 199 (Md. 1998); Federated
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Boise City, 915 P.2d 21 (Idaho 1996).
192. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (West 2011) (expressly excepting law en-
forcement personnel records from freedom of information disclosure); State v. Garrison, 711
N.W.2d 732 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished table decision) (exempting disclosure of
police disciplinary proceedings under personnel file exemption). See generally Jenny R.
Macht, Should Police Misconduct Files Be Public Record? Why Internal Affairs Investiga-
tions and Citizen Complaints Should Be Open to Public Scrutiny, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 5
(2009).
193. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Mass. 2001) (holding
that state wiretapping statute was intended to prohibit secretly recording the speech of any-
one, including police).
194. For an exception considering one piece of this landscape, see Macht, supra note
192.
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C. Comparative Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Policing
Legal scholars can also advance the regulatory enterprise by engaging in
comparative institutional analysis. As the law of the police suggests, police
departments, local governments, states, and the federal government influ-
ence police conduct. Although scholars have frequently compared the
mechanisms for preventing police misconduct, 195 effective reform also re-
quires identifying the optimal allocation of regulatory responsibility among
institutions.
Courts and scholars have long engaged in a limited form of institutional
analysis with respect to policing, and that analysis continues. The Warren
Court, after all, increased court involvement in protecting civil rights pre-
cisely because it concluded that alternative institutional actors had failed to
provide an adequate check of the police. More recently, judges and scholars
advocate new faith in the institutions criticized by the Warren Court, sug-
gesting, for example, that police departments and local governments 96 or
states' 97 or Congress'98 can now effectively regulate the police. Others main-
tain that even if these institutions are more favorable to civil rights than they
once were, the social and political forces that undermined the reform agenda
before the Warren Court would still undermine nonjudicial reform efforts
today. They conclude that, despite their substantial shortcomings, courts
remain the only realistic institutional option for protecting civil rights.'19
This debate still operates largely within the conventional paradigm. It
often lacks comparative focus, instead emphasizing the deficiencies of only
one institution. It fails to consider the full range of actors or the full array of
legal mechanisms available. And more importantly, it does not start with a
problem and ask what capabilities institutions would need to participate in
solving it. Instead, it criticizes what legal institutions do and argues that
195. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE
VIOLENCE, supra note 182, at 247, 251; Dripps, supra note 91, at 18 (listing proposed alter-
natives to the exclusionary rule but noting that none has ever been adopted by a state
legislature); Slobogin, supra note 91, at 394-400 (arguing that a modified administrative
damages regime would be a more effective deterrent mechanism than the exclusionary rule
or internal sanctions).
196. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government,
27 GA. L. REV. 343, 375-76 (1993); Eric Rakowski, Conceptual Interdependence and Com-
parative Competence, 27 GA. L. REV. 391, 403-04 (1993).
197. See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, Revocation, supra note 145, at 545-50, 577-79 (advo-
cating for more active state regulation of policing through decertification); Walker &
Macdonald, supra note 132, at 481-82 (proposing a model state statute analogous to § 14141
in order to "significant[ly] increase ... police reform efforts directed at patterns or practices
of police abuse of rights").
198. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 52, at 144-45 (advocating congressional commis-
sion to create a code of criminal procedure); Myriam Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform
Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1384, 1417-19 (2000) (proposing an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to allow private
citizens a voice in regulating police).
199. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 80, at 147-50; David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative
Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1243 (2002).
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someone else could do the same task better.200 More thorough comparative
analysis is well within the province of legal scholars.20 ' It would be valuable
here.
For example, Part I contended that courts cannot engage in the analysis
required to delineate and protect constitutional rights, much less provide a
normative framework for assessing what policing should be rather than what
it is constitutionally permitted to be. Courts cannot, for example, determine
the consequences of the real-world tradeoffs between effective policing and
individual freedoms that policing puts at stake. But a brief look at the obvi-
ous alternatives to courts suggests that the empirical and causal analysis
required likely demands new-and unfortunately improbable-institutional
capacity.
Police departments have access to department-specific data on aspects of
law enforcement effectiveness and harms, and they have enormous influ-
ence over the conduct of police officers. They are therefore well positioned
to assess how to balance individual and societal interests in law enforcement
and to reach that balance once it is identified. But departments with limited
resources and limited expertise in the social sciences would likely have dif-
ficulty engaging in broader causal analysis about how effective and harmful
alternative law enforcement practices are. Even if they could, departments
often lack the capacity to engage in effective rights protection.2 2 Civil rights
violations are the product of complex institutional arrangements that deter-
mine what police are permitted or incentivized to do.2"3 While police
departments have some unique knowledge, for example, about which offic-
ers are prone to violating rights or which policies lead to complaints, they
often have little expertise in identifying and implementing appropriate re-
forms. Even the largest and most motivated departments struggle to
200. William Stuntz came closest to avoiding this problem. For example, he helpfully
explored some of the local political-economic influences on police officers and departments,
and how they compare to federal law enforcement. See William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Feder-
alism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 665, 671-73 (2002) (observing
that local police behavior is constrained by local political accountability and by budgetary
limitations, which leave police with little time to harass citizens for harassment's own sake).
But even Stuntz focused much more on the political economy of crime control than the polit-
ical economy of policing, and he never meaningfully included state actors in his analysis.
See, e.g., Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 108, at 510.
201. See, e.g., NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 3-50 (1997) (calling for
comparative institutional analysis in law); William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A Com-
parative Institutional Critique, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 511 (2000) (using institutional
choice frameworks to analyze sprawl and smart growth policy); Nancy J. Knauer, The
Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Contested So-
cial Goals, and Strategic Institutional Choice, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (applying
comparative institutional analysis to examine the same-sex marriage movement); Timothy D.
Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN.
L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2000) (using comparative institutional analysis to argue that gun vio-
lence should be reduced through the tort system).
202. See Harmon, Proactive Policing, supra note 139, at 37.
203. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 459 (2004).
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determine whether problem-oriented policing or broken windows policing
results in more intrusions on constitutional rights; which use of force pol-
icies are likely to be effective at reducing harm to suspects and officers; or
how to implement a cost-effective early intervention system.2°4 For the
almost 15,000 local law enforcement agencies in the United States that em-
ploy fewer than 100 officers, such challenges are near impossible.0 5
Police departments also lack sufficient incentive to ensure that constitu-
tional rights-much less all civil rights interests-are adequately vindicated.
Police chiefs have good reasons to promote civil rights: increasingly, chiefs
recognize that harmful policing can undermine community relations, and
that bad community relations can make law enforcement less effective and
police officers less safe.20 6 Additionally, of course, the exclusionary rule and
§ 1983 impose some costs on departments, though scholars have long de-
bated how significant those costs are. However, chiefs are usually better
rewarded for maintaining order and reducing crime than protecting civil
rights. 20 7 Protecting rights can drain resources from law and order ends, at
least in the short run.20t If a police department refrains from using Tasers
against nonviolent suspects, it may make fewer arrests; if it requires officers
to log every Terry stop, it substitutes time filling out forms for time fighting
crime. Faced with these tradeoffs, chiefs may favor a policing practice that
is likely to be too harmful. Moreover, even if a police chief tries to promote
constitutional rights, he may face many of the substantial legal obstacles this
Article has described, including civil service laws, collective bargaining,
employment law, or a law enforcement officer bill of rights, all of which tax
efforts to protect civil rights.
Local governments create and control police departments, but to the de-
gree that police departments lack adequate incentives to protect civil rights,
local governments may cause the problem and cannot be expected to solve
it. As others have pointed out, the harms of policing are unevenly distribut-
ed. 0 9 Most citizens rarely experience them, except perhaps in the form of a
204. See Harmon, Proactive Policing, supra note 139, at 37 (noting that police depart-
ments often do not have the expertise to develop adequate reforms to prevent misconduct).
205. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2004, at 4-5 (2007), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/contentlpub/pdf/csllea04.pdf.
206. See, e.g., INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS: A
LEADERSHIP GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2006), available
at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e06064100.pdf (noting that law en-
forcement chiefs have recognized the value of organization commitments to civil rights).
207. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of
the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 781-82 (2004) [hereinafter Miller & Wright,
Secret Police] (noting that police departments do not bear the political or financial costs of
monetary judgments in police tort cases).
208. See Harmon, Proactive Policing, supra note 139, at 8. The short run matters dis-
proportionately to political actors. See id. at 46-47.
209. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 74 (1998) ("When a police department authorizes searches, it gen-
erates diffuse benefits and concentrated harms."); Stuntz, Local Policing, supra note 110, at
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traffic stop. Instead, in many cities, a much smaller group of citizens pay
much more than their fair share for policing. Research suggests, for exam-
ple, that African Americans and Latinos are much more often stopped,
searched, arrested, and hurt by the police than are others. °10 Public choice
theory contends that small groups with strong interests can sometimes have
disproportionate influence in government, but those who suffer the extra
burdens of policing frequently lack the cohesiveness and organization nec-
essary for that kind of advocacy success. The result is that a small part of
the population pays disproportionately for harms caused by policing and
may have too little power to negotiate for an efficient or fair distribution of
the costs.2"1 This effectively creates an externality that leads communities to
buy more harmful policing than is socially valuable or fair.
Police departments and local governments could do more to protect civil
rights than they do now. They could raise hiring standards, improve training,
develop better policies, supervise and discipline officers more effectively,
and so on. But many localities will need additional resources and incentives
to protect rights effectively, much less embrace constitutional interests more
broadly. That might mean education and technical assistance for depart-
ments about best practices or conditional grants intended to make reforms
more cost-effective. It may also mean more aggressive mandates and en-
forcement mechanisms. Whatever the methods, officers are incentivized by
police departments, police departments are shaped by local governments,
and none of the three can be counted on to produce consistently harm-
efficient policing under current conditions. Instead, regulating the police
requires nonlocal policy or law.
Although states are critical in shaping police conduct, they are not
presently good regulators of the police. Most state legislation and regula-
tion is now aimed at law enforcement effectiveness rather than civil rights.
This explains why basic training focuses so heavily on how to use force
and so much less so on how to avoid it, While some legislation seems de-
signed to reduce the harms officers impose, such as laws restricting arrests
for misdemeanors, these laws seem as likely to reflect other contingen-
cies-a restrictive rule that predates a less restrictive Supreme Court
decision, for example-than a will to promote civil rights comprehensive-
ly. State law also provides numerous mechanisms for remedying
2145-46 (noting the tradeoff between more police power and the harms that come with it,
and the harms of crime); Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, supra note 61, at 1822 (describing
high costs to police of intervening in upscale drug markets and relatively low costs of street
encounters).
210. See, e.g., Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Ar-
rests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 131, 1155 (2007); Patricia Warren et
al., Driving While Black: Bias Processes and Racial Disparity in Police Stops, 44 CRIMINOL-
OGY 709, 731 (2006), reprinted in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 108, at 264;
Michael D. White & Jessica Saunders, Race, Bias, and Police Use of the TASER: Exploring
the Available Evidence, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 108, at 382.
211. See, e.g., Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 109, at 786-814 (describing
increasing harshness of substantive criminal law and the fact that the groups with the most
interest in that law are often small and less sympathetic).
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misconduct, and though they have been little analyzed, they seem uni-
formly weak. Not all states have decertification laws, and many that do
rarely decertify officers or do so only following a criminal conviction.
212
State criminal prosecutions of police officers appear rare. 213 State exclu-
sionary rules and civil actions are sometimes weaker than their federal
analogs but face the same disadvantages with respect to reducing miscon-
duct.2 14 Even state courts are likely to be insufficiently protective: as Ronald
Wright and Marc Miller have pointed out, state judicial decisions are often
grudging even with respect to federal constitutional rights that should set a
floor on state civil rights protection.
215
One might argue that states would be more aggressive in regulating civil
rights if federal courts were less so. But state actors face disincentives for
protecting civil rights that would persist even if constitutional law were not
so dominant. State executives, legislators, and judges are all likely influ-
enced by police unions and officer associations. These powerful groups
have a strong interest in state law, which governs collective bargaining,
creates civil service regimes, dictates funding for law enforcement, affects
police officer safety, and determines the extent of officer discretion.21 6 They
also have considerable resources. By contrast, civil rights groups have little
apparent organization at the state level. As a result, unions can be effective
in opposing regulation, such as decertification laws, 217 or in capturing state
212. Roger L. Goldman, The Case for Peace Officer Decertification, Address at the
Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
(Sept. 14, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that six states-California, Hawaii, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island-have no mechanism for decertification and
that sixteen more permit decertification only following a criminal conviction); see also Roger
L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Officers' Licenses and Federal Criminal
Prosecution: An Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 121,
122 (2003) (describing the existing state of decertification laws and practices of states in
decertifying officers).
213. Cheh, supra note 195, at 251.
214. See, e.g., Miller & Wright, Secret Police, supra note 207, at 768 (noting statutory
caps on state civil suits); Sklansky, supra note 111, at 580-81 (discussing California's exclu-
sionary rule). See generally Cheh, supra note 195, at 260-61 (describing, but not
characterizing, state civil liability for uses of force).
215. See Miller & Wright, Leaky Floors, supra note 171, at 230.
216. The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 2009 would change
this, mandating collective bargaining arrangements with public safety employees, regardless
of state and local laws. See H.R. 413, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
217. See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, Revocation, supra note 145, at 564 (describing Cali-
fornia union opposition to expanding the powers of the state police officer standards and
training agency to increase revocation); id. at 566-67 (describing Florida union opposition to
increasing state control over police discipline); Steven Puro et al., Police Decertification:
Changing Patterns Among the States, 1985-1995, 20 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES
& MGMT. 481 (1997) [hereinafter Puro et al., Police Decertification]; Dan Walters, Police
Panel Deadlocked on Oversight, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 7, 2000, at A13 (illustrating union efforts
to resist expansion of state revocation).
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administrative bodies that supervise police departments.2 18 State actors
clearly sometimes have sufficient incentives to promote civil rights. Over
time, for example, states have adopted laws permitting or expanding decerti-
fication for misconduct.2 19 And some states do much more to regulate the
police than others.120 Overall, however, states have a relatively weak history
of civil rights regulation.
States could do more. The POSTs have broader knowledge about regu-
lating the police than do many local governments. Even under existing
political conditions, state actors might find reform more appealing if schol-
ars persuaded them that civil rights reform is consistent with cost-effective
crime control. They might adopt reform if it were made cheaper, for exam-
ple, by a conditional grant to states that required recording suspect
interrogations. And under the right conditions, state governments might
have the political will to regulate more effectively: a salient event could
raise popular concern and political interest in preventing constitutional vio-
lations. But as things stand, states are not very effective at preventing
constitutional violations or promoting civil rights more broadly, and existing
political incentives, which push legislators to reduce expenditures and in-
crease crime control, suggest it would be unwise to depend on states to do
much more without external pressure to do so.
Thus, while local and state actors already promote civil rights to some
degree, they likely cannot be expected to take adequate account of individu-
al constitutional rights and constitutional interests that extend beyond them.
They cannot and do not have sufficient reason to reach the appropriate
tradeoffs between effective policing and individual freedoms. This suggests
that addressing the problem of policing requires an institution--other than
state or local goverinments-capable of engaging in the causal and norma-
tive analysis that protecting civil rights requires, producing and
disseminating information about how to reduce harms to constitutional in-
terests while engaging in effective law enforcement, and incentivizing local
and state action toward these ends. As a result, the federal government
plays an ineliminable role in addressing the problem posed by the police.
Congress can engage in better analysis about the tradeoffs between indi-
vidual constitutional interests and law enforcement effectiveness, can facilitate
and incentivize reform, and is less prone to the local political forces that can
make protecting civil rights unappealing for other institutions. Congress has
long regulated some kinds of searches and has limited new means of obtaining
218. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 138 (alleging that the Massachusetts Civil Service
Commission is captured by the interests of government union employees).
219. Goldman & Puro, Revocation, supra note 145, at 547, 574 (noting that most states
have adopted revocation statutes, including six states between 1987 and 1996 and four more
since 1996); Puro et al., Police Decertification, supra note 217.
220. For example, Minnesota and Alaska require videotaping by judicial opinion. State
v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994); Stephan v. State, 711 P2d 1156, 1159 (Alaska
1985). Other states have passed statutes. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-
B(l)(k) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4503 (2008); N.M. STAT. § 29-1-16 (2006).
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and using private information deferentially regulated by the Court.2 21' Already,
it funds the DOJ's civil rights efforts, including criminal prosecution of local
law enforcement, funding for nonprofits that promote civil rights in law en-
forcement, and technical assistance to police departments. And it is responsive
to change: after court decisions restricted federal civil suits for injunctive relief
against police departments, 222 Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 14141 authoriz-
ing the DOJ to bring suits for equitable remedies against police departments
that engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct.223 But
congressional attention to civil rights is piecemeal and irregular, and its ef-
forts to promote civil rights are sometimes frustratingly unclear.
224
In other contexts, Congress has delegated the regulation of complex so-
cial problems to administrative agencies, but substantial obstacles exist to
federal administrative regulation of the police. Even limited federal inter-
vention into policing-which has always been a local concern-has been
politically controversial. 225 And relevant special interest groups, such as po-
lice unions, operate at the federal level as well as the state. Congress has not
yet required even mandatory data reporting for local police departments,
though this could easily be carried out by existing DOJ components and the
need for such data to regulate the police is obvious. 226 While it is not incon-
ceivable that Congress would authorize the DOJ to condition some federal
law enforcement funding on police department reforms or provide funds to
enable additional technical assistance to departments to promote civil rights,
more comprehensive regulation of the police, including the administrative
221. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2000)); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 90-231, 84
Stat. 1128 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2000)); Pen/Trap Statute (Pen Reg-
ister Act), Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1868 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2000));
Communications (Dill-Rayburn) Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 631, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 551 (2000)); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); see also Solove, supra note 57, at 763-67.
222. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983) (barring injunctive
relief for plaintiff harmed by the use of a chokehold by the Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD") because plaintiff did not face a realistic threat of being put in another chokehold
by the LAPD); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73 (1976) (striking down injunctive relief
because the plaintiffs lacked a personal stake in the court-ordered change to police discipli-
nary procedures); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-99 (1974); United States v. City of
Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the federal government does not
have implied statutory authority to enjoin local officials who are violating citizens' constitu-
tional rights).
223. See Harmon, Proactive Policing, supra note 139, at 12.
224. See Solove, supra note 57, at 748.
225. For example, while President George W. Bush was running for office, he stated, "I
do not believe the Justice Department should routinely seek to conduct oversight investiga-
tions, issue reports or undertake other activity that is designed to function as a review of
police operations in states, cities and towns." Eric Lichtblau, Bush Sees U.S. as Meddling in
Local Police Affairs, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 1, 2000, at A5.
226. See Harmon, Proactive Policing, supra note 139, at 29-34.
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analysis of the consequences of alternative law practices for individual and
societal interests, is unlikely and may not justify its costs.
Clearly, local, state, and federal institutions must all play a role in regu-
lating the police. Police officers and departments do not have sufficient
knowledge or incentives to minimize the harms policing risks. As a result,
preventing constitutional violations requires some additional means of in-
forming and influencing them. But existing means for protecting civil rights,
both federal and state, have serious problems, not least of which are the un-
noticed conflicting requirements of the real law of the police. More effective
remedies will be difficult to attain because no government institution has
both the ability and the motive to incentivize police officers and police de-
partments effectively.
As a result, one challenge for legal scholarship is to refine the analysis
of institutions in order to overcome obstacles to using existing governmental
institutions or utilizing alternatives for ensuring that police practices are
carried out to minimize harm. As challenging as the goal may be, it has been
made more difficult by the continued dominance of the Warren Court
paradigm. This conventional paradigm encourages scholars to focus on
constitutional rights rather than the problem of policing and the comparative
advantages of various governmental institutions in contributing to its regula-
tory solution.
What the police do is and always will be regulated. But knowing what
ends regulation should serve depends on understanding which police prac-
tices are harm efficient, predicting how regulation will affect police conduct
requires understanding how law and other forces determine that conduct,
and deciding who should regulate the police requires understanding the
comparative incentives and capacities of available institutional actors. Until
scholars embrace these projects, the regulation of police will inevitably re-
main wanting.
CONCLUSION
The police have always represented both hope and harm. They contrib-
ute to social order but also threaten it. While legal scholars interested in the
police study the judicial definition and enforcement of constitutional law,
the conventional paradigm inaccurately describes how the police are now
shaped by law and presents an inadequate normative vision for balancing
legitimate individual interests, such as liberty, privacy, autonomy, bodily
integrity, property, and equality, and the compelling societal interests in se-
curity and order. Though courts can judge the moral and historical
imperatives that underlie constitutional rights, they cannot assess conditions
on the ground or predict the consequences of legal rulings on civil rights
and law enforcement. The project of defining and protecting constitutional
rights inevitably requires input from other institutional actors.
Nor can constitutional rights set the agenda for policing reform. Consti-
tutional rights, by their nature, take law enforcement interests into account
ex ante and therefore are inevitably drafted to provide generous minimum
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standards for law enforcement conduct. And they cannot incorporate con-
sideration of the aggregate costs and benefits of law enforcement activities
at all. The problem of policing instead requires an account of when law en-
forcement should harm individual interests for societal ends, given the risks
to human dignity and the costs and benefits of law enforcement activity.
Such an account necessarily goes beyond constitutional rights.
Since the Warren Court, scholars have, like courts, often mistaken con-
stitutional law to be the sole or principal source for legal regulation of the
police. For decades, legal scholarship considering the police has taken as its
subject, and assumed as its method, the interpretation of constitutional
rights and remedies. The consequence has been tremendous attention to im-
proving doctrine and remarkable inattention to the problem policing
presents. Recent scholarship takes a different approach and orients itself
toward the problem of policing. But the project of studying the law and reg-
ulation of the police, rather than the constitutional law of the police, has
only just begun.
Understanding the complex problem of policing a free society requires
building on these recent efforts. It requires analyzing the law of the police-
the web of law that shapes what police do and that must inform any effort to
influence their conduct. And it requires more comprehensive institutional
analysis to determine how to allocate the complex task of articulating and
implementing a form of policing that is both effective and harm efficient.
Even when confined to constitutional criminal procedure, the project for
scholars was far from easy. Broadening the enterprise makes it more daunt-
ing still. But it also offers new promise of moving beyond the debates of the
past half century toward better governance of a complex and crucial social
and legal phenomenon.
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